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ABSTRACT 
 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have been applied to a wide range of application 
areas, including battle fields, transportation systems, and hospitals. The security issues in WSNs 
are still hot research topics. The constrained capabilities of sensors and the environments in 
which sensors are deployed, such as hostile and non-reachable areas make the security more 
complicated. 
This dissertation describes the development and testing of a novel two-phase security 
mechanism for hierarchical WSNs that is capable of defending both outside and inside attacks. 
For the outside attacks, the attackers are usually malicious intruders that entered the network. 
The computation and communication capabilities of the sensors restrict them from directly 
defending the harmful intruders by performing traditionally encryption, authentication, or other 
cryptographic operations. However, the sensors can assist the more powerful nodes in a 
hierarchical structured WSN to track down these intruders and thereby prevent further damage. 
To fundamentally improve the security of a WSN, a multi-target tracking algorithm is developed 
to track the intruders. For the inside attacks, the attackers are compromised insiders. The 
intruders manipulate these insiders to indirectly attack other sensors. Therefore, detecting these 
malicious insiders in a timely manner is important to improve the security of a network. In this 
dissertation, we mainly focus on detecting the malicious insiders that try to break the normal 
communication among sensors, which creates holes in the WSN. As the malicious insiders 
attempt to break the communication by actively using HELLO flooding attack, we apply an 
immune-inspired algorithm called Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA) to detect this type of attack. 
If the malicious insiders adopt a subtle way to break the communication by dropping received 
   
iv 
 
packets, we implement another proposed technique, a short-and-safe routing (SSR) protocol to 
prevent this type of attack.  
The designed security mechanism can be applied to different sizes of both static and 
dynamic WSNs. We adopt a popular simulation tool, ns-2, and a numerical computing 
environment, MATLAB, to analyze and compare the computational complexities of the 
proposed security mechanism. Simulation results demonstrate effective performance of the 
developed corrective and preventive security mechanisms on detecting malicious nodes and 
tracking the intruders. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Improved wireless communication and electronics promote the development of low-
power, low-cost and multifunctional sensor nodes [1].  Large numbers of such nodes can be 
deployed in a wireless sensor network (WSN) to sense and report data of importance.  Common 
application areas include hospitals, homes, battle fields, and transportation systems. Security is 
of high importance in most WSNs.  The sensors deployed typically run on batteries with limited 
power and computation ability. The communication channels can be unreliable and unattended 
operations result in vulnerability to attacks and sensor failures such as packet dropping, packet 
change, and energy-exhaustion. Traditional cryptographic security algorithms assume that all 
nodes are cooperative and trustworthy [2]. This assumption is not satisfied in most real-world 
WSN applications consequently traditional security approaches do not always apply to WSNs 
composed of large number of sensors with limited power and defense ability. 
1.1.  Motivation 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) consist of a number of nodes that are capable of 
communicating with each other absent a fixed infrastructure. However, arbitrary node 
movements and lack of a centralized control make them vulnerable to a wide variety of attacks 
from inside as well as from outside. Therefore, providing effective security protection is 
important to ensure continued viability of WSNs. In general, two complementary approaches 
exist to protect a system: prevention and detection.  
Intrusion prevention techniques, such as encryption and authentication, attempt to deter 
and block attackers. Unfortunately, prevention techniques can only reduce intrusions, not 
completely eliminate them [1, 2]. Despite the amount or quality of intrusion prevention 
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measures, an intelligent attack can exploit a single security hole to break into a system. Nothing 
is absolutely secure. Therefore, intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are indispensable for a 
reliable system. They serve as an important secondary line of defense. Intrusion detection can be 
based either on detecting malicious insiders or detecting harmful intruders.  
A malicious nodes detection technique identifies those nodes that have been attacked by 
harmful intruders and behaved harmfully to the normal operation of the sensor network. The 
malicious nodes may drop received packets instead of transmitting them. Such behavior can 
create holes in the network and damage the communications between sensors and the central 
center. If a malfunctioning node is recognized, an alarm is generated. No more packets are sent 
to this node. But more normal sensor nodes can be attacked if harmful intruders still exist in the 
sensor network. Therefore, detecting harmful intruders is needed.  
To prevent harmful intruders causing further damage, the first important step is to locate 
the intruders. In comparison with static intruders, mobile intruders commonly exist in practical 
applications, and are more difficult to track. Most algorithms use the sensor network to actively 
participate in the tracking process, sensing the target and propagating information regarding its 
position. The trade-off, in this case, is that there is a high message and energy consumption 
overhead. There are also issues concerning the scalability of those solutions and how they can be 
mapped into low density sensor networks; therefore a tracking algorithm that operates with low 
message overhead and low power consumption while scaling well is desired. A tracking 
technique based on Markov Chain Monte Carlo is developed in this dissertation to address these 
issues. 
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1.2.  Definition of Problems 
In this dissertation, we mainly explore three general but important security problems in 
wireless sensor networks (WSNs). 
1.2.1. Misbehavior Detection Problem 
In a wireless sensor network, sensors equipped with limited resources communicate 
wirelessly with each other. It is inevitable to have unexpected behavior happening. However, 
some sensors‘ behavior, like reporting messages with irregular high frequency or continually 
dropping packets, may seriously damage the normal operation of the network. Therefore, 
promptly detecting these sensors is necessary to ensure achieving the intended purpose of the 
network. In many cases, sensors are deployed in the environments where a central monitoring 
system is difficult or expensive to set up. It means that the sensors can only depend on 
themselves to identify misbehaving neighbors around them. The problem is how they distinguish 
misbehaving neighbors from normal ones with tolerable false positive rate. Deployed sensors are 
often used to monitor an environment and transmit collected information back to the base 
stations. So detecting misbehaving neighbors should not consume much of these sensors 
resources, even though it is an import task. What techniques can common sensors adopt to 
precisely and effectively detect misbehaving neighbors that mainly conduct flooding attack and 
packet dropping attack? This is the first problem addressed in this dissertation. 
1.2.2. Misbehavior Monitoring Problem 
Gray hole attack, in which the attackers only transmit routing packets but drop all or part 
of received data packets, is a common type of attack in WSNs. Comparing with other active 
attack like HELLO flooding attack, gray hole attack is more difficult to be detected because of 
its concealment. The longer the attackers exist in a WSN, the more damage they can make to the 
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network. Therefore detecting gray hole attackers can improve the security level of a WNS. In 
wired network, real-time monitoring is usually adopted to prevent attacks from outsiders or 
compromised insiders. Real-time monitoring is an ideal method, but it is impractical to use this 
method in WSNs because it will consume much of the sensors‘ energy. So the periodic 
monitoring method is naturally adopted by many researchers in the sensor network security area. 
The direct problem is what monitoring cycle should be chosen to maximize detection rate and 
minimize the energy consumption. To our knowledge, there are no such effective rules made for 
this decision yet. Besides these monitoring methods, are there any other techniques that we can 
use to meet a desired detection rate as well as to utilize energy effectively? This is another 
problem we try to solve in this work. 
1.2.3. Multi-target Tracking Problem 
When compromised insiders in a WSN are detected, they can‘t create further damage to 
the network. But that doesn‘t mean the WSN is safe. The malicious intruders are the true 
culprits. They can compromise more sensor nodes to keep damaging the WSN indirectly. 
Therefore, an active defense mechanism is required to maintain the security of a WNS. One of 
effective mechanisms is to track down the mobile malicious intruders in a WSN. This belongs to 
the location tracking problem, whose goal is to track the roaming paths of the moving objects in 
the area in which sensors are deployed. The essence of the target tracking problem is to find 
tracks from noisy measurements (observations), i.e., to associate measurements to the objects 
that really generate these measurements; more precisely, a partition of measurements is formed 
such that each element of a partition is a collection of measurements generated by a single target 
or cluster. It is not difficult to imagine that the number of optional partitions will rapidly increase 
with the number of mobile targets. So it is a challenge to quickly discover the true partition 
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among the numerous options. How to speed up the discovery of the objects‘ tracks is the last 
problem we try to explore in this work. 
1.3.  Contributions 
The central challenge in security is determining the difference between normal and 
potentially harmful activity. An Artificial Immune System (AIS) is a problem-solving 
methodology inspired by how biological immune systems in mammals detect pathogens and 
destroy them before they cause harm to the body. A particular class of AIS methodologies called 
Negative Selection Algorithms (NSAs) has been applied to anomaly detection problems [4]. 
Inspired by immunology, the approach uses a learning phase to construct detectors that can 
identify and dispatch invaders, but are not harmful to the organism itself. A fundamental issue in 
a NSA is maintaining distinguishing units from the host (self units) from the invaders (non-self 
units) [3]. Following another type of AIS, the work in [5] advanced the Danger Theory (DT) 
approach to intrusion detection. In Danger Theory, the central idea is that the immune system 
detects and responds to damage to the host, rather than upfront discrimination between self and 
non-self units. Dendritic cells play a central role in Danger theory. Work by Nauman and 
Muddassar [6] established a security system based on the behaviors of Dendritic Cells. The work 
reported in [7] includes detailed rules for a Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA) for analyzing 
abnormal signals. These DCAs are more flexible at detecting misbehaviors than NSAs, but do 
require a monitoring period to identify an intruder, resulting in inefficiency in situations with 
moving invaders. 
In real-world WSNs it is difficult to know how many invaders of different types are 
present. But knowing the distribution and the tracks of intruders is very helpful information for a 
Base Station (BS) to have for defending the network. In our work, we utilize a Multi-target 
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tracking technique to track mobile harmful intruders. A track is a path in time-space traveled by 
a target [8]. The data association problem is to identify the tracks of targets from noisy 
observations of target positions at known points in time. The multiple hypothesis tracker (MHT) 
[10] algorithm is the prominent methodology for solving the data association problem. In this 
setting, a hypothesis is an association of a set of observations with a target. A set of hypotheses is 
developed over time as observations become available over a monitoring period. At the end of 
the monitoring, the hypothesis with highest posterior is identified as the best solution. MHT is 
effective in detecting variable numbers of targets, but has high computational complexity since 
the number of hypotheses grows exponentially over time.  In [8], the authors proposed a Markov 
Chain Monte Carlo Data Association (MCMCDA) algorithm for tracking a variable number of 
targets in real-time. It was established that MCMCDA is computationally efficient compared to 
MHT and outperforms MHT when there are large number of targets. MCMCDA partitions the 
observations into groups corresponding to candidate tracks. The collection of different partitions 
forms the state space for the MCMC method that searches for the most likely partitioning into 
intruder tracks. Convergence rate is an important criterion on assessment of the MCMC 
algorithm ability [11]. The authors make two additional assumptions: (1) the maximal directional 
speed of any target is less than 𝑣; and (2) the number of consecutive missing observations of any 
track is less than  𝑑 . These assumptions make the computations of the proposal distribution 
easier. In our work, we further improve the convergence rate of the Markov Chains used in the 
MCMC approach. We classify observations into two types: normal observations and abnormal 
observations. We assume that each sensor node can sense an intruder approaching or moving 
away. Since a sensor can use the received signal strength to infer an intruder‘s moving tendency, 
this assumption is realistic. This assumption is then used to predict the moving area of an 
 7 
 
intruder at some time, calculated through the sensing of the energy level. We apply a Tabu 
Search technique [97] to the optimal solution searching process. These improvements decrease 
the size of the state space of the Markov Chain and speed up the convergence rate. Comparing 
with a full MCMCDA, our algorithm needs fewer samples to reach an optimal solution. 
In this work, we focus on two types of attacks: flooding attack and packet-dropping 
attack. These two types of attacks can cause serious interference to the normal operation of a 
WSN. They can create communication holes in a WSN and increase delay of information 
transmission, which are intolerable for some practical applications. Figure 1 shows the types of 
concerned attacks. Each of these attacks can have different defense strategies and adopted 
techniques. We try to adopt and design some security methods that meet both the security needs 
of applied applications and sensors characteristics. Figure 2 and 3 show the used 
countermeasures and techniques. To evaluate the effectiveness of each designed method, we also 
set some performance metrics for each method. Figure 4 shows the chosen performance metrics. 
 The main contribution of our work is the development of a two-phase security 
mechanism for WSNs with hierarchical structure by combining a DCA with a multi-target 
tracking algorithm and a Tabu Search technique. This development is based on similar validated 
research we did in [39]. The two-level hierarchical sensor network that we adopt for our 
experiments has a backbone of sparsely placed static high-end sensor nodes called Cluster Heads 
(CH). The low-end sensor nodes belong to different clusters based on their physical position. 
This hierarchical structure is well-suited for large scale sensor networks and is understood to be 
energy preserving [9]. The DCA works on the low-end nodes and identifies malfunctioning 
neighbors that have been attacked by harmful intruders. The primary malfunctions include 
packet dropping and energy-exhaustion. The ability to defend against these basic but widely 
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existing types of attacks in a WNS makes the algorithm a good fit in practice. The multi-target 
tracking algorithm implementing on Cluster Heads is used to track the mobile harmful intruders. 
Information about the distribution and the trajectory of harmful intruders is used by the Base 
Station (BS) to assess and evaluate current network defense capability. 
 
Figure 1. Types of attacks in WSNs 
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Figure 2. Defense strategies 
 
Figure 3. Adopted techniques for implementing defense strategies 
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Figure 4. Evaluated performance metrics 
Figure 5 shows the two-phase security architecture, in which hollow circles represent 
normal sensors, the solid circle represents a malfunctioning sensor, and the stars represent 
mobile intruders. Each low-end sensor node that runs the proposed DCA is responsible for 
detecting malicious neighbors. This DCA helps the sensor node identify deliberate misbehavior 
except occasional misbehavior such as a sensor node reports inaccurate data when its 
surrounding environment has sudden changes. An energy-consumption attack like HELLO flood 
attack can easily be detected by this immune-inspired algorithm. Another feature in the designed 
security mechanism is that Bayesian game theory based monitoring strategies are adopted to help 
a sensor node decide when to monitor a potential malicious node, which can effectively save 
energy without losing accuracy. The sensed target position is sent to the cluster head where the 
multi-target tracking algorithm is implemented. Finally, the tracking results are sent to the base 
station. 
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Figure 5. The two-phase security architecture 
The rest of this dissertation is organized as following. Chapter 2 includes two sections of 
reviews: one for recent development in AIS in general; another for some popular techniques used 
for multi-target tracking. Chapter 3 explores some security problems in wireless sensor networks. 
Chapter 4 details the proposed security methods for preventing malicious insiders. Chapter 5 
explores the basic techniques on target tracking, and details the improved multi-target tracking 
method for tracking malicious outsiders. Chapter 6 introduces some basic concepts of Tabu 
search, and details the proposed Tabu search method used for assisting the target tracking. 
Chapter 7 analyzes the simulation results and compares them with some other algorithms. 
Finally, the conclusions and future works are given in Chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1.  Artificial Immune System 
Forrest and Hofmeyer [25], [26] use AIS for intrusion detection in wired local area 
networks. Their work is based on the negative selection part of the self - nonself model and some 
form of danger signal. TCP connections play the role of self and nonself cells. One connection is 
represented by a triplet encoding the sender's destination address, the receiver's destination 
address and the receiver's port number. A detector is a bit sequence of the same length as the 
triplet. A detector matches a triplet if both have M contiguous equal bits, where M is a fixed 
system parameter. Candidate detectors are generated randomly; in a learning phase, detectors 
that match any correct (i.e., self) triplets are eliminated. This is done offline, by presenting only 
correct TCP connections. Non-eliminated detectors have a finite lifetime and die unless they 
match a nonself triplet, as in the immune system. The danger signal is also used: it is sent by 
humans as confirmation in case of potential detection. This is a drawback, since human 
intervention is required to eliminate false positives, but it allows the system to learn changes in 
the self. With the terminology of statistical pattern classification, this use of the danger signal 
can be viewed as some form of supervised training. Similarly, Dasgupta and Gonz a´lez [32] use 
an AIS approach to intrusion detection, based on negative selection and genetic algorithms. Kim 
and Bentley [3] show that straightforward mappings have computational problems and lead to 
poor performance, and they introduce a more efficient representation of self and nonself than in 
[25]. They show the computational weakness of negative selection and add clonal selection to 
address this problem [3]. In their subsequent papers, they examine clonal selection with negative 
selection as an operator [28], and dynamical clonal selection [29], showing how different 
 13 
 
parameters impact detection results. For an overview of AIS, see the book by de Castro and 
Timmis [31] and the paper by de Castro and von Zuben [30].  
2.2.  Multi-target Tracking 
Multi-object tracking algorithms depend on a single object tracking algorithm when 
objects are well-separated from one another. When objects are close to one another, the data 
association problem needs to be solved - there are exponentially many ways to associate 
measurements to known states. There are two well-known methods for dealing with the data 
association problem - the Multiple Hypothesis Tracker (MHT) in [66] and the Joint Probabilistic 
Data Association Filter (JPDA) in [67]. Figure 6 demonstrates how MHT works (the `X' marks 
denote new measurements, and triangles and circles denote tracks) - whenever new 
measurements are available from sensors, MHT generates hypotheses. In the worst case, the 
number of hypotheses can grow exponentially, and MHT uses heuristics such as gating (a 
measurement can be associated with a state only when it is within some distance from the state), 
pruning (one can compute the probabilities of the hypotheses and eliminate unlikely hypotheses), 
and N-scan-back (this heuristic considers only measurements within the recent N time steps). 
The main advantage of MHT is its ability to deal with the unknown number of objects even in a 
cluttered environment, where there could be many false and missing measurements. The 
flexibility of MHT comes at the cost of exponential storage and running time, and it is crucial to 
have good heuristics to prune unlikely hypotheses. Despite its worst case complexities, it has 
been used extensively in military applications due to its near-optimal performance and has been 
successfully implemented in the visual tracking community [69]. 
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Figure 6. MHT illustration 
JPDA is inherently a sub-optimal solution for the data association problem, since it 
considers only the most recent set of measurements. Given a state 𝑆𝑘
𝑖  at time 𝑘k, JPDA combines 
all the measurements{𝑍𝑘
1 ,…𝑍𝑘
𝑁} in a probabilistically consistent manner as follows, 
𝑝(𝑆𝑘
𝑖 |𝑍𝑘) =  𝛼𝑖𝑗 𝑝 𝑍𝑘
𝑗
|𝑆𝑘 𝑝(𝑆𝑘
𝑖 |𝑍𝑘−1)
𝑗
) 
where 𝛼𝑖𝑗  is a probability of associating the 𝑗𝑡𝑕 measurements 𝑍𝑘
𝑗
 to the 𝑖𝑡𝑕 state 𝑆𝑘
𝑖  and 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑗 =
1. As one can see from the above equation, JPDA has the polynomial running time and can be 
used with general dynamic models - JPDA does not specify how to compute a predicted 
posterior 𝑝 𝑆𝑘
𝑖  𝑍𝑘−1).  
In [71], the authors proposed a formal probabilistic approach called Identity Uncertainty 
to reasoning about identity under the framework of first-order logics of probability. Their setting 
is very general in that their framework allows one to pose identity questions with varying 
number of objects, properties and relations. 
Approximate inference for their formal language can be done using Markov Chain Monte 
Carlo (MCMC) algorithms [73], where the Markov chain is defined on a state space consisting of 
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the relational models of the first-order language. There are some notable differences between 
their approach and what we propose in this dissertation. First, their approach does not assume 
unique identities - in fact, the number of unique identities is an identity question posed in their 
language, while our approach assumes unique identities and exploits the  exclusion among them 
to update global identity information. Second, their method does not seem to be easily 
distributable, while one of the focuses of this dissertation is to design a framework that can be 
implemented in a purely distributed fashion in a WSN. Finally, the two approaches are 
fundamentally different in their goals - their approach concerns inference on identity, while we 
use identity information to update probabilities of different identities in a WSN. In fact, their 
approach can be used to implement a local identity sensing module in our framework, whose 
outputs can then be used by our approach to update global identity information. 
The general-purpose multi-target tracking algorithms such as the joint probabilistic data 
association filter (JPDAF) [74] and multiple hypothesis trackers (MHT) [75] are robust against 
the low detection probability and high false alarm rate. But they are not suitable for sensor 
networks since track initiation and termination is difficult with JPDAF and both JPDAF and 
MHT require large memory and computation cycles. Since MHT can initiate and terminate 
tracks, the tracking task can be easily distributed in a network of sensors. In [76], a distributed 
tracking algorithm based on MHT is developed for multiple sensors. But the approach is not 
suitable for sensor networks since it demands large computational power and a large amount of 
memory on each sensor. 
In [77], the authors propose to use a classification algorithm to disambiguate closely 
located targets. But signals received from targets are correlated and we cannot recover the 
uncorrelated signals in all cases. Since we do not know in advance the number of targets around 
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each sensor, the problem is ill-posed and very challenging even for a high-end computer. In [79], 
distributed track initiation and maintenance methods are described. By electing a leader among 
the sensors by which a target is detected, unnecessary communication is reduced while tracking 
targets using the nearest neighbor method. But considering the complexity of the data association 
problem, the approach will suffer from incorrect associations when there are many targets 
crossing or moving close to each other. In addition, when the false alarm rate is high, the 
proposed approach will overflow the network with spurious tracks and it is unclear how the 
missing observations are handled. Recently, some multi-target tracking algorithms specifically 
designed for sensor networks have been proposed to solve the identity management problem 
[78]. They assume the availability of a classification algorithm as in [77] but the disambiguation 
is delayed until targets are sufficiently separated. As assumed in the simulations of [78], when 
the targets are of different classes, a target can be classified by the signature of its class. But, if 
all targets are of the same class, a target cannot be easily classified by its signature and, in the 
absence of reliable classification information, the proposed methods will behave like the naive 
nearest neighbor tracker. Our algorithm can complement the identity management algorithms 
when tracking targets within the same class or when reliable classification information is not 
available. A distributed particle filtering algorithm for sensor networks is presented in [80] and 
used to track a single maneuvering target, assuming the availability of super nodes and a 
hierarchical topology similar to ours. The paper assumes the availability of sensors which can 
measure an angle and distance to a target. But sensors with such capabilities are costly and they 
are not suitable for a large sensor network with inexpensive sensor nodes. The most widely used 
and realistic sensor model is based on the signal strength and this is the model we use in this 
work. 
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CHAPTER 3. WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORK SECURITY 
One of the key issues rising from switching to wireless communication lies in security; 
while an air gap is among the most effective security measures in wired networks, wireless 
communication is not as easy to isolate from attack. The security issues in mobile ad hoc 
networks (MANETs) are more challenging than those in traditional wired computer networks 
and the Internet. Providing security in sensor networks is even more difficult than in MANETs 
due to the resource limitations of sensor nodes and security concerns remain a serious 
impediment to widespread adoption of these WSNs [12].  
3.1.  Wired & Wireless Networks 
Wireless networks have offered attractive flexibility to both network operators and users. 
Ubiquitous network coverage, for both local and wide areas, is provided without the cost of 
deploying and maintaining the wires. This fact is extremely useful in several situations like 
network deployment in difficult to wire areas, prohibition of cable deployment and deployment 
of a temporary network. Mobility support is another salient feature of wireless networks. Though 
there are varieties of challenges in sensor networks, here we focus on different security issues 
and possible remedies of those. Though security is a very important issue in WSN, due to various 
resource limitations and the salient features of a WSN, the security design for such networks is 
significantly challenging. In this chapter, we explore the security issues and challenges for next 
generation WSNs and discuss the crucial parameters that require extensive investigations.. 
Although most, if not all, security threats against the TCP/IP stack in a wired network are equally 
applicable to an IP-based wireless network, the latter possesses a number of additional 
vulnerabilities; wireless medium unreliability, spectrum use, power management, security, 
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limited bandwidth, system complexity, routing, Interfacing with wired networks and health 
concern make it more challenging to secure [13]. 
3.2.  Operation 
A WSN is a large network of resource-constrained sensor nodes with multiple preset 
functions, such as sensing and processing, to fulfill different application objectives. The major 
elements of WSN are the sensor nodes and the base stations (BSs). In fact, they can be abstracted 
as the ―sensing cells‖ and the ―brain‖ of the network, respectively. Usually, sensor nodes are 
deployed in a designated area by an authority and then, automatically form a network through 
wireless communications. Sensor nodes of homogeneous or heterogeneous type can be deployed 
randomly or at pre-determined locations using a deterministic scheme. Sensor nodes are static 
most of the time, whereas mobile nodes can be deployed according to application requirements. 
One or several, static or mobile [15] BSs are deployed together with the network. Sensor nodes 
keep monitoring the network area after being deployed. After an event of interest occurs, one of 
the surrounding sensor nodes can detect it, generate a report, and transmit the report to a BS 
through multi-hop wireless links. Collaboration can be carried out if multiple surrounding nodes 
detect the same event. In this case, one of them generates a final report after collaborating with 
the other nodes. The BS can process the report and then forward it through either high-quality 
wireless or wired links to the external world for further processing. The WSN authority can send 
commands or queries to a BS, which spreads those commands or queries into the network. 
Hence, a BS acts as a gateway between the WSN and the external world. An example is 
illustrated in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7. A wireless sensor network structure 
3.3.  Constraints 
Individual sensor nodes in a WSN have the inherent limitations in resources, which make 
the design of security procedures more complicated. A typical sensor node processor is of 4-8 
MHz, having 4KB of RAM, 128KB flash and ideally 916 MHz of radio frequency. Each of these 
limitations is due in part to the two greatest constraints — limited energy and physical size. 
Energy: Sensor nodes typically have a small form factor with a limited amount of battery 
power. Therefore, protocols designed for sensor networks should utilize only a few control 
messages. Sensor transducer, communication among sensor nodes and microprocessor 
computation consumes energy in sensor nodes, in that communication consumes more energy in 
WSNs. Any message expansion caused by security mechanisms comes at a significant cost. 
Further, higher security levels in WSNs usually correspond to more energy consumption for 
cryptographic functions.  
Memory: Sensor nodes usually have a small amount of memory. Hence, sensor network 
protocols should not require the storage of a large amount of information at the sensor node. 
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There is usually not enough space to run complicated algorithms after loading OS and 
application code. This makes it impractical to use the majority of current security algorithms. 
Scalability: The number of sensor nodes in a sensor network can be in the order of 
hundreds or even thousands. Hence, protocols designed for sensor networks should be highly 
scalable.  
Transmission Range: The communication range of sensor nodes is limited both 
technically and by the need to conserve energy.  
Fault Tolerance: Sensor nodes are prone to failure. This may be due to a variety of 
reasons. Loss of battery power may lead to failure of the sensor nodes. Thus, protocols designers 
should build fault tolerance into their algorithms for improving the utility of sensor networks.  
Self-Organization: Sensor nodes are often air-dropped in hostile or harmful 
environments. It is not possible for humans to reach these sensor nodes. Besides, it is not 
possible for humans to repair each sensor node, as often the number of sensor nodes is quite 
large. Hence, self- organization of sensor nodes to form a connected network is an essential 
requirement. 
3.4.  Security 
3.4.1. Reasons for Needing Security 
MANETs and sensor networks have many applications in military, homeland security, 
and other areas. In that many sensor networks have mission-critical tasks. Security is critical for 
such networks deployed in hostile environments, and security concerns remain a serious 
impediment to widespread adoption of these wireless networks. The security issues in MANETs 
are more challenging than those in traditional wired computer networks and the Internet. 
Providing security in sensor networks is even more difficult than in MANETs due to the resource 
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limitations of sensor nodes. Most sensor networks actively monitor their surroundings, and it is 
often easy to deduce information other than the data monitored. Such unwanted information 
leakage often results in privacy breaches of the people in the environment. Moreover, the 
wireless communication employed by sensor networks facilitates eavesdropping and packet 
injection by an adversary. The combination of these factors demands security for sensor 
networks at design time to ensure operation safety, secrecy of sensitive data, and privacy for 
people in sensor environments [14]. Significant efforts and research have been undertaken to 
enhance security levels of wireless networks. Currently, there are three levels of security 
available in wireless networking environments [16]. 
3.4.2. Factors Causing Complex Security in WSNs 
Security in sensor networks is complicated by the constrained capabilities of sensor node 
hardware and the properties of the deployment [14] and [15].  
(1) The overall cost of the WSN should be as low as possible. 
(2) Sensor nodes use wireless communication, which is particularly easy to eavesdrop on. 
(3) Similarly, an attacker can easily inject malicious messages into the wireless network. 
(4) Advanced anti-jamming techniques such as frequency- hopping spread spectrum and 
physical tamper proofing of nodes are generally impossible in a sensor network due to the 
requirements of greater design complexity and higher energy consumption. 
(5) The use of radio transmission, along with the constraints of small size, low cost, and 
limited energy, make WSNs more susceptible to denial-of-service attacks. 
(6) Ad-hoc networking topology of WSN facilitates attackers for different types of link attacks 
ranging from passive eavesdropping to active interfering. Attacks on a WSN can come 
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from all directions and target at any node leading to leaking of secret information, 
interfering with message, impersonating nodes, etc. 
(7) Security also needs to scale to large-scale deployments. Most current standard security 
protocols were designed for two-party settings and do not scale to a large number of 
participants. 
(8) There is a conflicting interest between minimization of resource consumption and 
maximization of security level. A better solution actually gives a good compromise 
between these two. 
(9) Since sensor nodes usually have severely constrained, asymmetric cryptography is often 
too expensive for many applications. Thus, a promising approach is to use more efficient 
symmetric cryptographic alternatives. 
3.5.  Taxonomy of Attacks 
Wireless networks are vulnerable to security attacks due to the broadcast nature of the 
transmission medium. Furthermore, WSNs have an additional vulnerability because nodes are 
often placed in a hostile or dangerous environment where they are not physically protected. For a 
large-scale sensor network, it is impractical to monitor and protect each individual sensor from 
physical or logical attack. Attackers may devise different types of security threats to make the 
WSN system unstable. Here, in this section, we present a layer-based classification of WSN 
security threats and also based on the capability of the attacker and defenses. 
3.5.1. Attacks Based on the Capability of the Attacker 
Outsider versus insider (Node Compromise) attacks - Outside attacks [14], [17] are 
defined as attacks from nodes, which do not belong to a WSN; insider attacks occur when 
legitimate nodes of a WSN behave in unintended or unauthorized ways. To overcome these 
 23 
 
attacks [14], we require robustness against Outsider Attacks, Resilience to Insider Attacks, 
Graceful Degradation with Respect to Node Compromise and Realistic Levels of Security.  
Passive versus active attacks: Passive attacks include eavesdropping on or monitoring 
packets exchanged within a WSN; active attacks involve some modifications of the data steam or 
the creation of a false stream.  
Mote-class versus laptop-class attacks: In mote-class attacks, an adversary attacks a 
WSN by using a few nodes with similar capabilities to the network nodes; in laptop-class attacks, 
an adversary can use more powerful devices (e.g., a laptop) to attack a WSN. These devices have 
greater transmission range, processing power, and energy reserves than the network nodes. 
3.5.2. Attacks on Information in Transition 
In a sensor network, sensors monitor the changes of specific parameters or values and 
report to the sink according to the requirement. While sending the report, the information in 
transit may be attacked to provide wrong information to the base stations or sinks. The authors 
[17] show some types of attack on information in transition. Interruption Communication link in 
sensor networks becomes lost or unavailable. This operation threatens service availability. The 
main purpose is to launch denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. From the layer-specific perspective, 
this is aimed at all layers. Interception Sensor network has been compromised by an adversary 
where the attacker gains unauthorized access to sensor node or data in it. Example of this type of 
attack is node capture attacks. This threatens message confidentiality. The main purpose is to 
eavesdrop on the information carried in the messages. From the layer-specific perspective, this 
operation is usually aimed at the application layer. Modification Unauthorized party not only 
accesses the data but also tampers with it. This threatens message integrity. The main purpose is 
to confuse or mislead the parties involved in the communication protocol. This is usually aimed 
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at the network layer and the application layer, because of the richer semantics of these layers. 
Fabrication An adversary injects false data and compromises the trustworthiness of information. 
This threatens message authenticity. The main purpose is to confuse or mislead the parties 
involved in the communication protocol. This operation can also facilitate DoS attacks, by 
flooding the network. Replaying existing messages this operation threatens message freshness. 
The main purpose of this operation is to confuse or mislead the parties involved in the 
communication protocol that is not time-aware. 
3.6.  Issues with High-Level Security Mechanisms 
3.6.1. Cryptography and Key Management 
To achieve security in WSNs, it is important to be able to perform various cryptographic 
operations, including encryption, authentication, and so on. Selecting the appropriate 
cryptography method for sensor nodes is fundamental to providing security services in WSNs. 
However, the decision depends on the computation and communication capability of the sensor 
nodes. Since sensor nodes usually have severely constrained resources, asymmetric cryptography 
is often too expensive for many applications. Thus, a promising approach is to use more efficient 
symmetric cryptographic alternatives. However, symmetric cryptography is not as versatile as 
public key cryptographic techniques, which complicates the design of secure applications. 
Applying any encryption scheme requires transmission of extra bits, hence extra processing, 
memory and battery power, which are very important resources for the sensors‘ longevity. 
Applying the security mechanisms such as encryption could also increase delay, jitter and packet 
loss in WSNs. 
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3.6.2. Intrusion Detection 
The problem of intrusion detection is very important in the case of WSNs. Traditional 
approaches which do an anomaly analysis of the network at a few concentration points, are 
expensive in terms of network's memory and energy consumption. So there is a need for 
decentralized intrusion detection [18]. Intrusion detection in WSNs is still largely open to 
research. Key research issues are [17]: 
(1) Due to the constraints in WSNs, intrusion detection has many aspects that are not of 
concern in other network types.  
(2) The problem of intrusion detection needs to be well defined in WSNs.  
(3) The proposed IDS protocols in literature focus on filtering injected false information only.  
(4) These protocols need to be improved so as to address scalability issues.  
(5) It is very difficult to integrate intrusion detection techniques into a uniform hardware 
platform due to cost and implementation considerations [15]. 
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CHAPTER 4. DANGER THEORY INSPIRED SECURITY APPROACHES 
In this chapter, we present proposed danger theory inspired security approaches. These 
approaches are primarily used to detect two types of attacks conducted by malicious insiders: 
active flooding attack and passive packet dropping attack. An effective approach on detecting 
malicious insiders should have a low false positive rate, the ratio representing the number of 
normal nodes mistakenly detected as malicious ones to the total number of normal nodes. The 
characteristics of Danger Theory, one of models of Artificial Immune System (AIS), make it as 
an appropriate choice on accurately detecting abnormal events. 
4.1.  AIS Background 
An Artificial Immune System uses an analogy with the natural Immune System (IS) of 
vertebrates. As an approximation, the immune system can be described with the self-nonself 
model. The immune system is thought to be able to classify cells that are present in the body as 
self and non-self cells. The immune system is made of two distinct sets of components: the 
innate IS, and the adaptive IS. The innate immune system is hard-wired to detect (and destroy) 
nonself cells that contain, or do not contain, specific patterns on their surface. The adaptive 
immune system is more complex. It produces a large number of randomly created detectors. A 
negative selection mechanism eliminates detectors that match any cell present in a protected 
environment (bone marrow and the thymus) where only self cells are assumed to be present. 
Non-eliminated detectors become naive detectors; they die after some time, unless they match 
something (assumed to be a pathogen), in which case they become memory cells. Further, 
detectors that do match a pathogen are quickly multiplied (clonal selection.); this is used to 
accelerate the response to further attacks. Also, since the clones are not exact replicates, (they are 
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mutated, and mutation rate is an increasing function of affinity between detectors and the 
pathogen) this provides a more focused response to the pathogen (affinity maturation). This also 
provides adaptation to a changing non-self environment. The self-nonself model is only a very 
crude approximation of the adaptive IS. Another important aspect is the danger signal model 
[19]. With this model, matching by the innate or adaptive mechanism is not sufficient to cause 
detection; an additional danger signal is required. The danger signal is for example generated by 
a cell that dies before being old. The danger signal model better explains how the IS adapts not 
only to a changing non-self, but also to some changes in self. There are many more aspects to the 
IS, some of which are not yet fully understood. 
Many algorithms in the field of AIS have been developed. One of the major algorithms 
developed within AIS is the negative selection algorithm, first proposed by Forrest et al. [20] and 
then subsequently developed over the years [21, 22]. This paper investigates the real-valued 
negative selection algorithm with variable-sized detectors [23] and its applicability to network 
intrusion traffic. The negative selection algorithm is often cited for its potential use in intrusion 
detection problems due to its ability to generate a set of detectors from a single class of data 
(usually the normal network traffic), that is capable of identifying possible intrusions. However, 
there remains little work in the literature regarding the application of the negative selection 
algorithm with variable-sized detectors to network intrusion detection.  
4.2.  Danger Theory 
4.2.1. Introduction 
We now examine the biological basis for the self-nonself metaphor, and the alternative 
Danger Theory (DT) hypothesis. The human immune system (HIS) is commonly thought to 
work at two levels: innate immunity including external barriers (skin, mucus), and the acquired 
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or adaptive immune system [36]. As part of the latter level, B-Lymphocytes secrete specific 
antibodies that recognize and react to stimuli. It is this matching between antibodies and antigens 
that lies at the heart of the HIS and most AIS implementations. The central tenet of the immune 
system is the ability to respond to foreign invaders or ‗antigens‘ while not reacting to ‗self‘ 
molecules. In order to undertake this role the immune system needs to be able to discern 
differences between foreign, and possibly pathogenic, invaders and non-foreign molecules. It is 
currently believed that this occurs through the utilization of the Major Histo-compatibility 
Complex (MHC). This complex is unique to each individual and therefore provides a marker of 
‗self‘. In addition, the cells within the immune system are matured by becoming tolerated to self-
molecules. Together, through the MHC and tolerance, the HIS is able to recognize foreign 
invaders and send the requisite signals to the key effecter cells involved with the immune 
response. The DT debates this and argues that there must be discrimination happening that goes 
beyond the self-nonself distinction because the HIS only discriminates ‗some self‘ from ‗some 
nonself.‘ It could therefore be proposed that it is not the ‗foreignness‘ of the invaders that is 
important for immune recognition, but the relative ‗danger‘ of these invaders. This theory was 
first proposed in 1994 [37] to explain current anomalies in our understanding of how the immune 
system recognizes foreign invaders. For instance, there is no immune reaction to foreign bacteria 
in the gut or to food. Conversely, some auto reactive processes exist, e.g. against self-molecules 
expressed by stressed cells. Furthermore, the human body (self) changes over its lifetime. 
Therefore, why do defenses against nonself learned early in life not become auto-reactive later? 
The DT suggests that foreign invaders, which are dangerous, will induce the generation of 
cellular molecules (danger signals) by initiating cellular stress or cell death [38]. These 
molecules are recognized by APCs, critical cells in the initiation of an immune response, which 
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become activated leading to protective immune interactions. Overall there are two classes of 
danger signal; those which are generated endogenously i.e., by the body itself, and exogenous 
signals which are derived from invading organisms e.g., bacteria [34]. Evidence is accruing as to 
the existence of myriad endogenous danger signals including cell receptors, intracellular 
molecules and cytokines. A commonality is their ability to activate APCs and thus drive an 
immune response. 
We believe that the DT will provide a more suitable biological metaphor for IDS than the 
traditional self-nonself viewpoint, regardless whether the theory holds for the HIS, something 
that is currently hotly debated amongst immunologists ([35], [40]). In particular, the DT provides 
a way of grounding the response, i.e., linking it directly to the attacker and it removes the 
necessity to map self or nonself [33]. In our model, self-nonself discrimination will still be useful 
but it is no longer essential. This is because nonself no longer causes a response. Instead, danger 
signals will trigger a reaction. Actually, the response is more complicated than this, since it is 
believed that the APCs integrate necrotic (‗danger‘) and apoptotic (‗safe‘) signals in order to 
regulate the immune response. We intend to examine this integrative activity experimentally, 
which should provide useful inspiration for IDS. 
In 2003, Aickelin et al outlined a project describing the application of a novel 
immunological theory, the Danger Theory to intrusion detection systems [5]. The authors of this 
work suggested that the Danger Theory encompassed pathogenic detection, where the basis for 
discrimination was not centered around ‗self‘ or ‗non-self‘, but to the presence or absence of 
danger signals. The paper described how danger signals are released from the body‘s own tissue 
cells as a result of necrotic cell death, triggered by an invading pathogen. The immune system 
was thought to be sensitive to changes in concentration of danger signals and hence an 
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appropriate response is generated. Aickelin et al propose that by differentiating between the 
chaotic process of necrotic cell death and the safe signals derived from regulated apoptotic cell 
death, pathogenic agents can be detected within an artificial immune system context. Currently, 
the majority of artificial immune systems (AIS) encompass two different types of immune 
inspired algorithms, namely negative selection (T-cell based), and clonal selection with somatic 
hyper-mutation (B-cell based). Exceptions to this include [42], where defined patterns of 
misbehavior were used to create danger signals within mobile ad-hoc networks. Danger signals 
are used in [41] to define the context for collaborative filtering. Implementations including 
Danger Theory, so far, have monitored danger signals directly and have not taken into account 
any of the cells responsible for signal detection. It is thought that danger signals are detected and 
processed through ‗professional‘ antigen presenting cells known as dendritic cells (DCs). DCs 
are viewed as one of the major control mechanisms of the immune system, influencing and 
orchestrating T-cell responses, in addition to acting as a vital interface between the innate (initial 
detection) and adaptive (effecter response) immune systems. DCs are responsible for some of the 
initial pathogenic recognition process, sampling the environment and differentiating depending 
on the concentration of signals, or perceived misbehavior, in the host tissue cells. Strong 
parallels can be drawn from this process to the goal of successful anomaly detection. Current 
anomaly detection systems frequently rely on profiling ‗normal‘ user behavior during a training 
period. Any subsequent observed behavior that does not match the normal profile (often based 
on a simple distance metric) is classed as anomalous. At this point an ‗alert‘ is generated. 
However, these systems can have problems with high levels of false positive errors, as behavior 
of users on a system changes over a period of time. Anomaly detection systems remain a high 
research priority as their inherent properties allow for the detection of novel instances, which 
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could not be detected using a signature based approach. AIS featuring negative selection 
algorithms have been tried and tested for the purpose of anomaly detection [43]. They produced 
promising results, but were tarnished by issues surrounding false positives and scalability [44]. 
Some moderately successful non-AIS systems have been implemented, often involving adaptive 
sampling [45] and adaptive alert threshold modification. The aim of this research is to 
understand the Danger Theory and its implications and to be able to derive an anomaly detection 
system. 
4.2.2. Nervous System 
Muscles and bones are what move your body, but how does your body know when to 
move? The nervous system tells your body. Your nervous system is made up of the brain, spinal 
cord, nerves, and sense organs. Without this system you would not be able to speak, think, taste, 
hear, or see. The nervous system knows exactly what is going on both inside and outside your 
body. It is able to make sense of all the information it receives and respond to it. 
The nervous system would not work without nerve cells called neurons. Neurons pass 
messages throughout your body. Each neuron (Figure 8) has a cell body with short branches 
sticking out on one side and a long branch on the other side. The short branches are called 
dendrites. Dendrites get messages from other neurons and give them to the cell body. The long 
branch, called the axon, moves messages away from that neuron to other nerve cells. 
When the dendrite of a neuron gets a message, the chemicals in the neuron change. This 
change causes an impulse, or message, to move across the neuron. The impulse moves from the 
dendrite to the cell body. It leaves the neuron through the axon. The message then gets picked up 
by the dendrites of the next neuron and causes an impulse in that neuron. This is how messages 
move from one neuron to the next.  
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Most of these impulses move along neurons to your brain. Your brain controls almost 
everything you experience. When your brain gets a message from your nervous system, it makes 
sense of the message and tells your body how to react. 
This message is sent through the spinal cord. The spinal cord is a long bundle of nerves 
that runs down your back. Some neurons of the spinal cord bring messages to the brain. Others 
carry messages away. 
 
Figure 8. A neuron diagram [74] 
The Danger Theory, proposed by Polly Matzinger in 1994 [46], also emphasizes the 
crucial role of the innate immune system for guiding the adaptive immune responses. However, 
unlike detecting exogenous signals, the Danger Theory rests on the detection of endogenous 
signals. Endogenous danger signals arise as a result of damage or stress to the tissue cells. The 
crucial point of the Danger Theory is that the only pathogens detected are the ones that induce 
necrosis and cause actual damage to the host tissue. The damage can be caused by invading 
micro-organisms or through defects in the host tissue or innate immune cells. Irrespective of the 
 33 
 
cause, the danger signals released are always the same. These signals are thought to be derived 
from the internal contents of the cell [47] inclusive of heat shock proteins, fragmented DNA and 
uric acid. It is proposed that the exposure of antigen presenting cells to danger signals modulates 
the cells‘ behavior, ultimately leading to the activation of naive T-cells in the lymph nodes. 
Alternatively, the absence of danger signals and the presence of cytokines released as a result of 
apoptosis can lead to antigen presentation in a different context, deleting or energizing a 
matching T-cell [48]. The Danger Theory suggests that the tissue is in control of the immune 
response. In [49] it is suggested that DCs have the capability to combine signals from both 
endogenous and exogenous sources, and respond appropriately. Different combinations of input 
signals can ultimately lead to the differentiation and activation of T-cells. Both theories have 
implications for the function of DCs.  
4.2.3. Dendritic Cells 
Dendritic cells (DCs) are white blood cells, which have the capability to act in two 
different roles - as macrophages in peripheral tissues and organs and as a vehicle for antigen 
presentation within the secondary lymphoid organs. DCs can be sub-categorized dependent on 
their location within the body. For the purpose of this investigation and the subsequent 
algorithm, dermal or tissue resident DCs have been examined. Essentially, the DCs‘ function is 
to collect antigen from pathogens and host cells in tissues, and to present multiple antigen 
samples to naive T-cells in the lymph node. DCs exist in a number of different states of maturity, 
dependent on the type of environmental signals present in the surrounding fluid. They can exist 
in immature, semi-mature or mature forms.  
Immature DCs: Immature DCs (iDCs) are cells found in their initial maturation state. 
They reside in the tissue where their primary function is to collect and remove debris from the 
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interstitial fluid. The ingested material is then processed by the cell. It is either metabolized for 
use by the cell, returned to the environment, or is repackaged for presentation to another immune 
cell. At this point the matter can be termed antigen, and could be a ‘self‘ molecule or something 
foreign. The representation of antigenic material is performed by complexion the antigen with 
another molecule namely the MHC molecule family, necessary for binding to T-cell receptors. In 
order to present antigen to T-cells, DC needs sufficient antigen presented with MHC. However, 
the expression of inflammatory cytokines is needed in order to activate T-cells. Therefore a T-
cell encounter with an iDC results in the deactivation of the T-cell. Differentiation of iDCs 
occurs in response to the receipt of various signals. This leads to full or partial maturation 
depending on the combination of signals received. 
Semi-Mature DCs: During the antigen collection process, iDCs can experience other 
environmental conditions. This can affect the end-stage differentiation of a DC. These different 
conditions can give rise to semi-mature DCs (smDCs). The signals responsible for producing 
smDCs are also generated by the tissue - endogenous signals. During the process of apoptosis, a 
number of proteins are actively up-regulated and secreted by the dying cell. The release of TNF-
_ (tumor necrosis factor) from apoptosing cells is thought to be one candidate responsible for 
creating semi-mature DCs [50]. As a result of exposure to apoptotic cytokines, an iDC also 
undergoes migration to the lymph node. Costimulatory molecules are up-regulated by a small yet 
significant amount and, after migration to the lymph node, the cell can present antigen to any 
matching T-cell. However, smDCs do not produce any great amount of pro-inflammatory 
cytokines, necessary for promoting activation of T-cells. Instead, smDCs can produce small 
quantities of IL-10 (anti-inflammatory cytokine), which acts to suppress matching T-cells.  
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Mature DCs: Due to the low levels of inflammatory cytokines expressed by iDCs, they 
are not able to activate T-cells on contact. In order to present antigen and activate T-cells, the 
increased expression (or up-regulation) of a number of proteins and cytokines is necessary. DCs 
which have the ability to activate naive T-cells are termed mature DCs (mDCs). For an iDC to 
differentiate and become a mDC, the iDC has to be exposed to a certain number of signals. This 
includes activation of toll-like receptors through exposure to both the exogenous and endogenous 
signals (previously described). On exposure to various combinations of these signals, the DC up-
regulates a number of molecules vital for stimulating a T-cell response. Perhaps most 
importantly, it up-regulates a number of costimulatory molecules, pro-inflammatory cytokines 
(namely IL-12), and migrates from the tissue to the local draining lymph node. During this 
migration period, the iDC changes morphologically too. Instead of being compact, the DC 
develops finger-like projections - characterizing it as an mDC. The projections not only make it 
distinguishable from iDCs, but also increase the surface area of the cell, allowing it to present a 
greater quantity of antigen. 
In brief, DCs can perform a number of functions, related to their state of maturation. 
Modulation between these states is facilitated by the release of endogenous and exogenous 
signals, produced by pathogens and the tissue itself. The state of maturity of a DC influences the 
response by T-cells, either immunogenic or tolerogenic, to specific presented antigen. Immature 
DCs reside in the tissue where they collect antigenic material and are exposed to exogenous and 
endogenous signals. Based on the combinations of signals, mature or semi-mature DCs are 
generated. Mature DCs have an activating effect while semi-mature DCs have a suppressive 
effect. The different cytokine output by the respective cells differ sufficiently to provide the 
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context for antigen presentation. In the following section this information is utilized to derive a 
signal processor based on the explored functionality of the DCs. 
4.3.  Preventing Flooding Attack 
To identify malicious insiders that implement a flooding attack, we propose a new DCA. 
A DCA is a problem-solving method that is based on the behavior of DCs. An innovation of our 
method is that the monitoring period is dynamically adjusted by the base station in accordance 
with the current network status.  Thus, we refer to the method as a Dynamic Dendritic Cell 
Algorithm (DDCA) [94]. Algorithm 1 illustrates the structure of this algorithm. This proposed 
DDCA is capable to recognize the following types of attacks in a WSN: the transmitting of 
modified messages; the reporting of messages with an abnormal frequency; and the reporting of 
fake messages. When a sensor node sends out a message, we assume that all the neighbor nodes 
of the sender can receive and interpret the message. Each sensor node has the ability to discern if 
a neighbor node is transmitting a suspicious message (such as a modified or false message). A 
sensor node flags a harmful intruder if the number of suspicious messages exceeds a pre-
specified threshold value. Sensor nodes are typically battery powered and have limited energy 
that must be used efficiently. The energy consumption rate for communication greatly exceeds 
that for sensing.  Thereby, the useful lifetime of a WSN is largely governed by the management 
of the transmitting and receiving of messages. Ignoring messages rather than communicating 
with harmful intruders conserves energy.   
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Algorithm 1:  The dynamic dendritic cell algorithm (DDCA) 
   𝒎𝒏:  New message 
𝑻𝟏:    The maximum time slice calculating abnormal frequency of reporting message 
𝑻𝟐:    The maximum time slice supervising a suspicious intruder      
𝑯𝑰, 𝑺𝑯𝑰:      Harmful Intruder, Semi-Harmful Intruder                
𝒕𝟎, 𝒕𝟏, 𝒕𝟐, 𝒕𝟑:  Thresholds for reporting message frequency during  𝑇1 , reporting message 
frequency during 𝑇2, reporting false message rate during 𝑇2, reporting changed message rate 
during 𝑇2, respectively 
 (Note: to tolerate casual high frequency of reporting message, let 𝑇2 > 𝑇1) 
 bool   checkDangerMessage (𝑚𝑛 ) 
1.  if  (𝑚𝑛came from a 𝐻𝐼)  return true 
2.  if  (𝑚𝑛came from a 𝑆𝐻𝐼) 
3.       if  (checkHarmfulIntruder(𝑚𝑛 ) == true) return true 
4.  if  (checkAbnormalMessage(𝑚𝑛 ) == true)  update 𝑆𝐻𝐼 list 
5.  return false 
  bool   checkAbnormalMessage (𝑚𝑛 ) 
1.  if (𝑚𝑛  is a changed original message)  return true 
2.  if (𝑚𝑛  is a fake message)  return true 
3.  if (the frequency of the sender reporting message > 𝑡0)  return true 
4.  return false 
 38 
 
  bool   CheckHarmfulIntruder (𝑚𝑛 ) 
1. Update the history message record of the sender  
2. Estimate the frequency and percentage of the sender  
3. if  ( (𝑡1   reached) or (𝑡2 reached) or (𝑡3 reached)) 
4.      Clear the history record of the sender; Move the sender from 𝑆𝐻𝐼 list to 𝐻𝐼 list 
5.      return true 
6.  if (𝑇2 reached )    Remove the sender from 𝑆𝐻𝐼  list  
7. return false      
 
This algorithm consists of three sub-functions: checking for dangerous messages, 
abnormal messages, and harmful intruders. When a sensor node receives a new message, the 
algorithm first checks the harmful intruder (HI) list.  If the sender of this message is an identified 
harmful intruder, the message is considered to be a dangerous message. If the sender is an 
identified suspicious intruder that exists in the semi-harmful intruder (SHI) list, the algorithm 
runs the function for identifying harmful intruder to decide if this sender is dangerous enough to 
be considered harmful. Finally, the algorithm runs the function of checking for abnormal 
messages and possibly puts the sender on the SHI list. This algorithm will only consume limited 
energy of a sensor node because of the simple calculation in each sub-function. The dynamic 
adjustment of parameters increases the flexibility and accuracy of the DC-inspired algorithm in 
detecting dangerous messages. 
During the process of identifying malicious insiders, a normal node maintains a danger 
level (𝑑𝑙 ) for each sensed suspicious insider. This danger level is useful for the proposed 
monitoring scheme, which is presented in the next section. 
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4.4.  Preventing Packet Dropping Attack 
4.4.1. Bayesian Game Based Monitoring Scheme 
To prevent packet dropping attack, we first need to label the malicious insiders. A 
malicious insider may implement gray hole attack mentioned in [3]. This type of attacker is 
called gray hole. Gray holes usually only transmit routing packets and drop data packets. In this 
work, we consider a more general gray hole attack, namely light-gray hole attack (LGHA), in 
wireless sensor networks. A malicious node selectively forwards packets instead of dropping all 
packets. This type of attack is harder to be detected than dropping all packets attack. 
We consider a two-player static Bayesian game. One player is a potential attacker (a 
malicious insider, denoted by 𝑀𝐼). The other player is a defender (a normal insider, denoted by 
𝑁𝐼 ). Player 𝑀𝐼 has private information about his type, which is either regular, denoted by 𝜃i  = 0, 
or malicious, denoted by 𝜃𝑖  = 1. In other words, the maliciousness of player 𝑖 is unknown to the 
defender  𝑁𝐼 . Defender  𝑁𝐼  is of regular type denoted by 𝜃𝑗  = 0. The type of defender 𝑁𝐼  is 
common knowledge to the two players. 
The malicious type of player 𝑀𝐼 has two pure strategies: Attack (drop packets) and Non-
attack (transmit packets). The regular type of player 𝑖 has only one pure strategy: Non-attack. 
Defender  𝑁𝐼  has two pure strategies: monitor (query the destination) and Non-monitor (not 
query the destination). The two players choose their strategies simultaneously at the beginning of 
the game, assuming common knowledge about the game (costs). Here the belief 𝜇0 is the danger 
level calculated by the proposed DDCA during the process of identifying malicious insiders. It 
dynamically changes throughout the detecting process. Therefore, its value has high credibility. 
A normal node can‘t predict when a malicious node decides to drop received packets. But 
the normal node can find if a packet is dropped by probing (querying) to the other normal node 
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right next to this malicious node on the route. This detecting method is also mentioned in [27]. 
The main difference between our probing method and the one in [27] is that we adopt Bayesian 
game based strategies to decide when to do the probe instead of the periodic probe used in [27]. 
As malicious nodes randomly or strategically drop received packets, the periodically probing 
method is inefficient. A shorter monitoring period has higher routing overhead, and longer 
monitoring period has lower detection rate. Therefore we adopt Bayesian game theory based 
strategies to decide the proper monitoring time. In this game, the two players are a normal node 
and a malicious node. Table 1 shows the payoffs for different combinations of strategies adopted 
by the two players. The symbol 𝜔 represents a loss of security whose value is equivalent to a 
degree of damage such as loss of reputation, loss of data integrity, or cost of damage; the 
symbol  𝛼 represents the detection rate; the symbol  𝛽 represents the false positive rate, 
and 𝛼,𝛽 𝜖  0, 1 ; the symbol 𝑐𝑎  represents the cost of attacking; and the symbol 𝑐𝑚  represents the 
cost of monitoring. 
In the case that player 𝑁𝐼 adopts the strategy monitor and player 𝑀𝐼 adopts the strategy 
non-attack, the payoff of player 𝑁𝐼 is (−𝛽𝜔 − 𝑐𝑚  ), which is the sum of the cost of false decision 
and the cost of monitoring. Since player 𝑀𝐼 doesn‘t have any loss, its payoff is zero. If the 
strategy combination is non-monitor and attack, the payoff of player 𝑁𝐼 is (−𝜔), the cost of 
damage caused by the missed attack. And the payoff of player 𝑀𝐼 is (𝜔 − 𝑐𝑎  ), which is the gain 
from the loss of player 𝑁𝐼 excluding the cost on the attack. Similarly, if the strategy combination 
is monitor and attack, the payoff of play 𝑁𝐼 is the sum of the gain (𝛼𝜔) caused by the right 
decision, the cost  1 − 𝛼 𝜔 caused by the false negative rate, and the cost on monitoring (𝑐𝑚  ), 
i.e., totally ( 2𝛼 − 1 𝜔 − 𝑐𝑚  ). And the payoff of player 𝑀𝐼 is ( 1 − 2𝛼 𝜔 − 𝑐𝑎  ), the gain from 
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the loss of player 𝑁𝐼 excluding the cost on the attack. In the last case that nobody adopts monitor 
or attack, their payoffs are both zero. 
Table 1.   Strategic Form of Static Bayesian Game 
 
  
The objective of the two players is to maximize their own payoff with incomplete 
information, i.e., without knowing another player‘s decision before making their own decision. 
How can the players make their best strategies which can help them achieve maximal payoff 
whatever strategies their opponent use? Bayesian game theory makes it possible to solve this 
problem. According to this theory, two players in a game can achieve their respective maximal 
payoff under Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) [52] situation, in which everybody is doing the 
best they can, given what everybody else is doing. So, we next try to find this equilibrium for the 
two players. 
 
A Malicious Insider ( 𝑀𝐼 ) 
Non- Attack Attack 
A
 N
o
rm
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 I
n
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d
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 (
𝑁
𝐼)
 
Monitor 
 −(𝛽𝜔 + 𝑐𝑚  ), 0  2𝛼 − 1 𝜔 − 𝑐𝑚  ,  1 − 2𝛼 𝜔 − 𝑐𝑎   
Non- Monitor 
 0,                 0 −𝜔,                                   𝜔 − 𝑐𝑎   
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We use symbol 𝜇0 to represent the danger level of player 𝑀𝐼 in this game, which can be 
obtained from the proposed immune-inspired algorithm. This value is a common prior for both 
players, i.e., player 𝑀𝐼 knows defender 𝑁𝐼′s belief of 𝜇0  . 
If player  𝑀𝐼 plays his strategy attack, the expected payoff of defender  𝑁𝐼 playing his 
strategy monitor is  
𝐸𝑁𝐼 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟 =  𝜇0  2𝛼 − 1 𝜔 − 𝑐𝑚   +  1 − 𝜇0 (−𝛽𝜔 − 𝑐𝑚  ), 
and its payoff playing the strategy not monitor is 
𝐸𝑁𝐼 𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟 =  −𝜇0𝜔 . 
If  𝐸𝑁𝐼 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟 >  𝐸𝑁𝐼 𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟 , or 𝜇0 >
 1+𝛽 𝜔+𝑐𝑚  
(2𝛼+𝛽−1)𝜔
 , strategy monitor seems to be 
the best strategy for player  𝑁𝐼  because of its greater payoff. However, when player  𝑁𝐼 play 
monitor, player  𝑀𝐼  will change its strategy to non-attack from attack. Hence, (𝜇0 , monitor, 
attack) is not a BNE when 𝜇0 >
 1+𝛽 𝜔+𝑐𝑚  
(2𝛼+𝛽−1)𝜔
 . Since using pure-strategy can‘t achieve the BNE, 
we need to adopt a mix-strategy for this case, which will be explained later. If  𝜇0 <
 1+𝛽 𝜔+𝑐𝑚 
(2𝛼+𝛽−1)𝜔
 , 
player 𝑁𝐼 prefers to use strategy non-monitor. Player 𝑀𝐼 will keep its strategy attack. Hence (𝜇0  , 
non-monitor, attack) is a BNE when 𝜇0 <
 1+𝛽 𝜔+𝑐𝑚  
(2𝛼+𝛽−1)𝜔
  . 
If player  𝑀𝐼  plays its strategy non-attack, strategy non-monitor seems to be the best 
strategy for player 𝑁𝐼 whatever the value of 𝜇0 is. But, player 𝑀𝐼 would change its strategy to 
attack if player 𝑁𝐼 plays non-monitor. Hence, the final stable state will be (𝜇0 , non-monitor, 
attack), which is a BNE as we analyzed before. 
Now, we analyze how the players adopt a mix-strategy to maximize their payoff when 
 𝜇0 >
 1+𝛽 𝜔+𝑐𝑚  
(2𝛼+𝛽−1)𝜔
. Let 𝑝  be the probability with which player  𝑀𝐼  plays attack, and 𝑞 be the 
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probability with which player 𝑁𝐼 plays monitor. The new expected payoff of player 𝑁𝐼 playing 
monitor is  
𝐸𝑁𝐼
∗  𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟 =  𝑝𝜇0  2𝛼 − 1 𝜔 − 𝑐𝑚   + (1 − 𝑝𝜇0)(−𝛽𝜔 − 𝑐𝑚  ), 
and its new expected payoff playing non-monitor is  
𝐸𝑁𝐼
∗  𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟 =  −𝑝𝜇0𝜔 . 
When 𝐸𝑁𝐼
∗  𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟 =  𝐸𝑁𝐼
∗  𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟 , we get 𝑝∗ =  
𝛽𝜔 +𝑐𝑚  
(2𝛼+𝛽)𝜔𝜇0
 . This is the probability 
that player 𝑀𝐼 plays equilibrium strategy attack. Similarly, we can calculate the probability that 
player 𝑁𝐼 plays equilibrium strategy monitor. Let 𝐸𝑀𝐼
∗  𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 = 𝐸𝑀𝐼
∗  𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 , i.e.,  
𝑞𝜇0  1 − 2𝛼 𝜔 − 𝑐𝑎   +  1 − 𝑞𝜇0   𝜔 − 𝑐𝑎   =  𝑞𝜇0 ∗ 0 +  1 − 𝑞𝜇0 ∗ 0 = 0. 
We get 𝑞∗ =  
𝜔−𝑐𝑎  
2𝛼𝜇0𝜔
 , which is the best monitoring strategy for the player 𝑁𝐼 based on the value 
of 𝜇0.  
According to the above analysis, both players can choose proper strategies under 
different situations. Here we are concerned that player  𝑁𝐼  chooses proper strategies for 
monitoring attack. Besides using  𝜇0  as the belief, player  𝑁𝐼  can also refer to the maintained 
reputation table of its neighbor nodes to make monitoring decision. 
Each normal node maintains a neighbor table that lists all neighbors and records if it has 
data packets communication with them recently. For example, node 𝑥 has some neighbors, and 
for each neighbor 𝑖: 
< 𝑥, 𝑖 >  
1     𝐼𝑓 𝑥 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑖 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑙𝑦
          0     𝑂𝑡𝑕𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
  
             < 𝑖,𝑥 >  
1     𝐼𝑓 𝑥 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑖 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑙𝑦
0     𝑂𝑡𝑕𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 . 
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It only needs small storage to save this information, but it is very useful on evaluating each 
neighbor‘s reputation. 
As the packet dropping rate exceeds the predefined threshold, which is set to be slightly 
above the normal packet dropping rate, the malicious node is recognized as a real attacker. The 
normal node also put the new detected malicious node in its malicious node list. 
4.4.2. Short-and-Safe Routing Protocol 
After malicious insiders are recognized, the direct preventive measure is not using the 
routes that contain malicious insiders to transmit packets. However, as we assumed, malicious 
nodes conducting a packet dropping attack don‘t attack routing traffic, i.e., the routing 
information that the source node received is real. Can the source node depend on the routing 
information and the detected malicious insiders to choose a safe and short route? Here we 
propose a new routing protocol that is capable of mitigating the packet dropping attack and 
maintaining network performance, i.e., find a short-and-safe route for the source node to transmit 
packets. 
We propose a short-and-safe routing (SSR) protocol to find a both safe and short route 
for transmitting data packets. Before running this protocol, the source node should be able to 
distinguish safe routes from unsafe ones. A route including suspicious nodes is considered to be 
an unsafe route. Actually, the safety information has been included in the route before sending 
back to the source node. The source node only needs to check the safety flag to see if it is a safe 
route or not. This flag is set by the intermediate normal node on the route.  
As an intermediate normal node receives a Route Response (RREP) from a suspicious 
neighbor, it sets the unsafe route flag in RREP as true before forwarding it back to the source 
node. It is possible that there is more than one malicious node on a RREP route, and some of 
 45 
 
them try to reset the flag to off if they find the flag has been set on, which is a kind of 
cooperation attack. However this kind of cooperation attack can‘t be successful, because the 
malicious node nearest to the source node can always be detected by its upstream node, which is 
an intermediate node or the source node itself. So the safety flag can always be correctly set, and 
help the source node to make a right decision. 
In paper [26], the authors proposed an effective algorithm to identify multi-cooperative 
black holes. That algorithm assumes that a source node (SN) considers a node is believable if it 
has routed data through this node recently, otherwise the node is unbelievable. The process of 
finding cooperative black holes is as below: (1) the SN broadcasts a RREQ to find a rout to the 
destination node; (2) if an intermediate node has a route to the destination, it sends back a RREP 
to the SN, otherwise appends itself to the end of the route then forward this updated RREQ; (3) 
later, the SN receives the first RREP from a node. If this node is believable, the SN sends 
packets to it, otherwise ask for its next hop node (NHN); (4) if this NHN is still unbelievable, the 
SN asks for its NHN again, this process keeps going until a believable NHN is reached; (5) if the 
last unbelievable NHN provides different data routing information (DRI) from the one of the 
believable NHN, the SN can judge that all these queried unbelievable NHNs are cooperative 
black holes.   
This algorithm can effectively disclose cooperative black hole attack. But in practical 
sensor network applications, malicious nodes are likely to adopt more flexible strategies to avoid 
being easily detected, for example, initiating gray hole attack by transmitting routing packets and 
dropping data packets. To solve this problem, we propose a short-and-safe routing protocol 
indicated in algorithm 2. 
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Figure 9 shows an example of a gray hole attack. There are ten nodes in this graph. Node 
S represents the source node, node D represents the destination node, node 3 represents a gray 
hole, which is a malicious node conducing a gray hole attack, and others are normal nodes. 
When the gray hole receives a route request (RREQ) broadcasted by the source node, it forwards 
the RREQ to its neighbor nodes instead of dropping it. When this request reaches to the 
intermediate nodes that have a fresh enough route to the destination node, in this case nodes 5 
and 6, they initiate a route response (RREP) and unicast back to the origination of the RREQ.  A 
fresh enough route is a valid route entry for the destination whose associated sequence number is 
at least as great as that contained in the RREQ. Because each node receiving the request caches a 
route back to the originator of the request, the RREP can be unicast from any intermediate node 
which is able to satisfy the request to the source node. These intermediate nodes also append the 
route from them to the destination in the RREPs. Later the source node receives some optional 
routes to the destination node. Some routes consisting of all normal nodes may be longer than 
those consisting of both normal nodes and gray holes. The source node should choose or 
recombine a route that is both short and safe based on received optional routes.  
In Figure 9, there are two RREPs initialed by normal nodes 5 and 6 respectively. The two 
original routes and the merged route are: 
(1) The first original route is 5 → 3 →  2 →  𝑆.  The entire route is 𝐷 → 7 → 5 →  3 → 2 →  𝑆. 
The number of hops of this route is five, and it is an unsafe route because a gray hole is in 
this route. 
(2) The second original route is 6 →  4 → 𝑆.  The entire route is 𝐷 → 9 → 8 → 5 → 6 → 4→ 𝑆. 
The number of hops of this route is six, and it is a safe route. Since the shorter route is 
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unsafe and the safe route is longer, we can merge these two routes and discover a new route 
that is safe and shorter than any received safe routes. The merged route is below. 
(3) The merged route is 𝐷 → 7 → 5 → 6 →  4 → 𝑆. This route has five hops, the same as the first 
route. But it doesn‘t have any malicious nodes, it is a safe route. The source node will 
choose the merged route to send data packets. 
 
Figure 9. Propagation of RREP messages (node 3 is a gray hole attacker) 
Algorithm 2 first sorts received safe routes. Then it saves the rout with shortest path 
length in a variable. Next, each intermediate node (IN) that initiates routing request response is 
checked to see if a shorter route can be found based on received safe routes. If a safe route 
includes this IN, a new fresh route is discovered. It consists of the first part of this safe route, this 
IN, and the second part of the route that the IN is in. Figure 10 shows an example of discovering 
a new route from an unsafe route and a safe route, in which (a) is an unsafe route with a suspect 
node X, (b) is a safe route including node N that initiates a RREP in the unsafe route, and (c) is 
the merged route that is safe and shorter than the route in (b). If this new safe route is shorter 
than the previously saved one, it is saved as the new shortest route. Finally, as all intermediate 
nodes are checked, the shortest route is found. 
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Algorithm 2:  Short-and-safe routing (SSR) protocol 
        Input:   the unsafe route and all optional safe routes 
      Output: SS 
1.  Sort all safe routes and save the shortest one to the variable SS 
2.  for (all intermediate nodes -INs that initiate RREP) 
3.  for (all safe routes) 
4.       if (the considering IN is in the considering safe route) 
5.               Merge these two routes into a new safe route that consists of the first part of the   
              safe route, the IN, and the second part of the unsafe route 
6.                if (this new route is shorter than SS) 
7.                       Save this route to SS 
8.                end if 
9.     end if 
10.   end for 
11. end for 
 
Since a normal node maintains a reputation table of its neighbors, it is easy to decide if a 
neighbor is safe or not for transmitting packets. When each intermediate node transmits a RREP 
route back to its upstream node, it sets the flag indicating the safety of a node ―on‖ if it thinks 
this upstream node is unsafe based on its reputation table. Otherwise, it sets the flag ―off‖. At 
last, the source node can check this flag to decide if it is a safe RREP 
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Figure 10. An example of merging two routes 
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CHAPTER 5. MULTI-TARGET TRACKING 
The proposed techniques for detecting malicious insiders were introduced in the previous 
chapter. Now we focus on the designed techniques on detecting malicious outsiders (malicious 
intruders). Malicious intruders may attack a sensor network through their agents (malicious 
insiders) or themselves. No matter what methods malicious intruders adopt to attack a sensor 
network, the most effective way to prevent their attack is to track them down. In this chapter, we 
fist introduce some theoretical knowledge on mobile target tracking, and then present our 
proposed multi-target tracking techniques. 
5.1.  Bayesian Theory 
5.1.1. The Bayes Formula 
We will here review the terminology used for the Bayesian analysis of uncertainties in 
modeling. To simplify the notations in this section, let 𝜃 stand for all the unknowns in our model. 
The inference concerning𝜃 is performed using the conditional distribution of the parameter, 
given the model and the observations 𝑝(𝜃|𝑦). This probability distribution is called the posterior 
distribution. By the rules of conditional probabilities, we can invert the posterior and arrive at the 
Bayes formula: 
𝑝 𝜃 𝑦 =  
𝑝  (𝑦 |𝜃)𝑝  (𝜃) 
𝑝  (𝑦)
 . 
The right hand side of the Bayes formula has the following ingredients. The likelihood 
function, 𝑝 𝑦 𝜃 , is the density function of the observations 𝑦 y given 𝜃 . When the observed 
data 𝑦 are held fixed, 𝑝 𝑦 𝜃  is considered as a function of the parameters 𝜃. If for two possible 
parameter values 𝜃 and 𝜃′   we have 𝑝 𝑦 𝜃′  > 𝑝 (𝑦|𝜃), then the observation 𝑦  is more likely to 
happen under 𝜃′ than under 𝜃, hence the term "likelihood." 
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The unconditional distribution of the unknowns, 𝑝 𝜃 , is called the prior distribution. 
This describes the knowledge about the unknowns that existed before, or exists independent of, 
the current observations. Again, when the data 𝑦 are fixed, the term in the denominator, 𝑝 𝑦 , is 
a single number, which can be seen as a constant that normalizes the likelihood-times-prior part 
into a proper probability distribution. When comparing different models for the same data, this 
unconditional probability of observations can also be seen as a (prior) predictive probability of 
the observations given the model. For this reason it is sometimes called the evidence. By the rule 
of total probability, we can calculate its value by integrating the product 𝑝 𝑦 𝜃 𝑝  𝜃  over all 
values of 𝜃, i.e., 
𝑝 𝑦 =  ∫ 𝑝 𝑦 𝜃 𝑝 𝜃 𝑑𝜃. 
This integral makes the actual computation of the posterior distribution a challenging task 
in all but some special cases. For most cases we need special numerical algorithms, e.g., the 
MCMC algorithm described below. 
5.1.2. Predictive Distribution 
An important element in Bayesian inference is the prediction of future observations 𝑦∗ 
given the current ones 𝑦. Given the observations 𝑦 and the model 𝑝 𝑦 𝜃 , the predictions are 
naturally based on the posterior distributions of 𝜃. If we assume that 𝑦 and 𝑦∗   are conditionally 
independent given the value of 𝜃, we can write 
𝑝 𝑦∗|𝑦 =  ∫ 𝑝 𝑦∗,𝜃 𝑦 𝑑𝜃 = ∫ 𝑝( 𝑦∗ 𝜃 𝑝(𝜃|𝑦)𝑑𝜃. 
Here the predictive distribution of 𝑦∗ is given as the expectations of 𝑝 𝑦∗ 𝜃  with respect 
to the posterior distribution 𝑝(𝜃|𝑦). In this work we use the simulated MCMC chain as a sample 
from 𝑝(𝜃|𝑦). If we sample 𝜃  from the chain and 𝑦∗ from 𝑝 𝑦∗ 𝜃 , we obtain samples of the 
predictive distribution 𝑝 𝑦∗|𝑦 . The predictive distribution is the basis for the validation of the 
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model against reality. This is not possible using only the posterior distribution of the model 
parameters 𝜃, as the parameters are not directly observable. 
5.1.3. Prior Information 
Next, we consider the role of prior information and the problem of assigning the prior. In 
a straightforward classical interpretation of Bayesian inference the prior signifies the modeler‘s 
honest opinion about the unknown. In most modeling activities dealing with scientific inference, 
however, the idea of subjective probability seems restrictive. A common concern has to do with 
the problem of formulating the prior as "objectively" as possible. The solutions proposed include 
such concepts as non informative [51], hierarchical [52], reference [53], vague, or diffuse [54] 
priors. We will encounter three uses of the prior distribution in the course of this work: 
uninformative priors, describing a lack of, or unwillingness to provide prior information on the 
unknowns, priors that provide structural information about the solution, and finally priors that 
are based on empirical evidence from previous experiments. A modeler would usually be happy 
if the data were to produce informative posteriors "without a prior". Even if we had information 
about the unknowns from previous similar experiments, we would like the data to verify our 
conclusions. This usually means using very wide priors in the Bayes formula for some or all of 
the components of the unknown. Care must be taken that the posterior becomes a proper 
distribution. 
Sometimes the prior gives the structure of the solution. In inverse problems where the 
state of the system is estimated, for example, we can have information on some of the properties 
of the system. In these cases the solution might not exist, or it could very unstable, unless some 
prior information is used [55]. If this regularization of the problem is done via a prior 
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distribution, we can have an intuitive interpretation for the restrictions and a better view of the 
effects of the premises on the conclusions.  
When the data are sparse a great deal of effort should be put into selecting the prior 
distribution. When possible, the prior should be based on real information. In large-scale 
problems with a large number of unknowns it is usually not possible to formulate detailed priors. 
If we assume that the unknowns are a priori independent, we can independently assign one-
dimensional densities to each of them. 
If model parameters can be given physical interpretations, it is a lot easier to assess the 
prior. A natural prior restriction in many models is a requirement of positivity. The use of priors 
makes it possible (for good and evil) to consider models that are more complicated than would 
be necessary for predictive purposes. Assessing priors can in practice be seen as an iterative 
process of the same kind as the building of a model. For example, if a model is described by 
differential equations, the initial values of the state variables might be unknown. If we have 
observations on the state variables at the beginning of the period, then the prior for the initial 
values should contain information from these observations, and also information about the 
accuracy of the observations. But the latter is probably available only after a preliminary fit, 
from the residual variance.  
There exists a longstanding philosophical controversy over the nature of statistical 
inference and its relation to the "real world", as in the question of whether it is appropriate, or 
even possible, to assign a statistical prior distribution to the value of an unknown parameter in a 
model, or for an unknown state in nature, if these are not random variables. In science we must 
be able to criticize all aspects of our methods and results. This includes the statistical paradigm 
used. Applied Bayesian statistics works very well in practice. Thanks to the computational 
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Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods, we are able to work with more complicated and realistic 
model than before, pool prior information from various sources, and easily produce probability 
statements about the predictions of the model that can be verified by future observations. 
5.2.  Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) 
High-dimensional estimation problems pose a computational challenge that can be solved 
only by simulation methods. The normalizing constant makes computation of the posterior 
distribution in difficult problem, especially in multidimensional cases. A clever algorithm, 
Metropolis-Hastings Algorithm, provides a simple method for simulating values from a 
distribution that can be calculated only up to a normalizing constant. 
We will use the notation 𝜋 𝜃  for the target distribution of interest. This is common in 
the MCMC literature. In most cases, the target will be the posterior distribution for the model 
unknown, 𝜋 𝜃 = 𝑝 𝜃 𝑦 .  
In MCMC simulation we produce a sequence of values which are not independent but 
instead follow a stochastic process called a Markov chain. The algorithm used in the simulation 
ensures that the chain will take values in the domain of the unknown 𝜃 and that its limiting 
distribution will be the target distribution 𝜋 𝜃 . This means that we have a method of sampling 
values from the posterior distribution and therefore of making Monte Carlo inferences about 𝜃 in 
the form of sample averages and by means of histograms and kernel density estimates.  
The MCMC algorithm produces a chain of values in which each value can depend on the 
previous value in the sequence. For example, a random walk MCMC algorithm advances the 
sequence by proposing and conditionally accepting or rejecting new values by means of a 
proposal distribution centered at the current position of the MCMC chain. The values are not 
independent but instead have some positive autocorrelation. Because of this, the sample averages 
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used as estimates for the corresponding posterior values have error due to the sampling 
procedure, so called Monte Carlo error, that is larger than in the i.i.d. (independent identically 
distributed) case. There is no general way to get rid of this problem, however. On the other hand, 
random walk sampling in a high-dimensional space has advantages over i.i.d. sampling. As paper 
[54] points out, high-dimensional spaces are very sparse. If we consider the unit hyper sphere 
that is located inside a unit hyper cube, we see that the total space consists almost entirely of 
corners and a very small part of the volume of the space is contained inside the sphere. We are 
confronted with problems of finding the regions of statistical significant probability and of 
exploring those regions. Random walk-type methods try to offer solutions to the problem of 
getting lost in the space. A remedy for larger Monte Carlo errors is to perform longer simulations 
than would be needed in the i.i.d. sampler case, and also to try to make the MCMC methods as 
efficient as possible. The latter is one of the main motivations behind the present work. 
5.3.  The Metropolis-Hastings Algorithm 
The Metropolis-Hastings (MH) algorithm is currently the most general algorithm for 
MCMC simulation. Its basic form is easy to explain and implement and it has several useful 
generalizations and special cases for different purposes. The basic idea depends on the fact that, 
if instead of computing the values 𝜋 𝜃  we need only compute the ratio of the target at two 
distinct parameter values 𝜋 𝜃 /𝜋 𝜃∗ , the integral in the Bayes formula cancels out. 
With an MCMC algorithm we are generating a chain of values 𝜃0 ,, 𝜃1, . . . , 𝜃𝑁  in such a 
way that it can be used as a sample of the target density 𝜋 𝜃 . In terms of the Markov chain 
theory [59], when using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm we generate a Markov chain that has 
a transition kernel according to 
𝑝 𝜃,𝜃∗ = 𝑞 𝜃,𝜃∗ 𝛼 𝜃,𝜃∗ , 𝜃 ≠ 𝜃∗, 
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𝑝 𝜃,𝜃 =  1 −   𝑞 𝜃, 𝜃∗ 𝛼 𝜃, 𝜃∗ 𝑑𝜃 
for some transition density 𝑞 , and for an acceptance probability 𝛼. The density 𝑞(𝜃, ·) , with 𝜃 
being the current location of the chain, is called the proposal density. The chain is said to be 
reversible if we have 
𝜋 𝜃 𝑞 𝜃,𝜃∗ 𝛼 𝜃,𝜃∗ =  𝜋(𝜃∗)𝑞  𝜃∗ ,𝜃 𝛼 𝜃∗ ,𝜃 . 
Reversibility is a sufficient condition for the density 𝜋  to be the stationary distribution of the 
chain, 
 𝜋 𝜃 𝑝 𝜃, 𝜃∗ 𝑑𝜃 = 𝜋(𝜃∗) 
meaning that if the chain were to reach 𝜋, it would also follow this distribution for the rest of the 
simulation. This leads to the choice of the Metropolis-Hastings acceptance probability 𝛼 as 
𝛼 𝜃,𝜃∗ =  𝑚𝑖𝑛(1,
𝜋 𝜃∗ 𝑞 𝜃∗,𝜃 
𝜋 𝜃 𝑞 𝜃 ,𝜃∗ 
). 
The parameter space 𝛩 is usually a subset of ℝ𝑑  , but the reversibility condition can be 
formulated for more general state spaces. 
The proposal distribution from which we choose new values for the chain can be quite 
arbitrary, but choosing a distribution that most closely resembles the true target distribution can 
dramatically speed up the convergence of the values generated to the right distribution. The 
closer the proposal distribution 𝑞 is to the actual target 𝜋 𝜃 , the better the chain mixes and the 
better a short sequence represents a random draw from the posterior. This is especially true in 
multidimensional cases and when there is correlation between the components of the parameter 
vector. In the applications described in this work the proposal density is taken to be the 
multidimensional Gaussian density.  
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The algorithm is constructed in such a way that the target distribution 𝜋 is the stationary 
distribution of the Markov chain. This means that the generated values will eventually follow the 
posterior distribution 𝜋. In practise, we must allow some burn-in time to let the chain become 
close enough to the limiting distribution. The MH algorithm can be thought of as travelling 
uphill towards the peak of the posterior distribution, but occasionally taking steps downhill. The 
percentage of time spent in each region of the hill corresponding to the probabilities of the target 
distribution. 
For the convergence results we need some theory of Markov chains, although with one 
important simplification: it is known by construction that the stationary distribution 𝜋 exists. 
Also, we are able to choose the initial distribution arbitrarily. This provides simple ways of 
proving important ergodic properties of the MH chain: The Law of Large Numbers type of 
theorem that says that we can use sample averages as estimates and apply the Central Limit 
Theorem, which gives us the convergence rate for the algorithms. 
5.4.  Multi-target Tacking Problem 
The tracking problem can be formulated as a stochastic estimation problem, where the 
goal is to estimate the mostly likely state  𝑆𝑘  at time  𝑡 = 𝑘 , given a history of sensor 
measurements{𝑆1 , … ,𝑆k} . This formulation requires two models - the dynamic model  𝑆𝑘 =
𝑓 𝑆𝑘−1 ,𝑛𝑘−1  and the measurement model 𝑍𝑘 = 𝑔 𝑆𝑘 ,𝑤𝑘 , where 𝑛𝑘  and 𝑤𝑘  are the stochastic 
transition noise and the measurement noise, respectively. The seminal work by Kalman [60] 
provides an optimal, iterative solution of this formulation under rather strict assumptions of 
linear, Dynamic and Gaussian measurement models given as follows: 
𝑆𝑘 = 𝐴𝑘𝑆𝑘−1 + 𝑛𝑘−1, 
𝑍𝑘 =  𝐻𝑘𝑆𝑘 +  𝑤𝑘 . 
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For sensing modalities like acoustic sensors or laser range sensors, however, the Gaussian 
assumption is not satisfied and a more general mathematical framework is required to deal with 
the general noise characteristics. Bayesian filtering [61] is a mathematical framework, where one 
can iteratively compute a posterior distribution given a history of measurements. Bayesian 
filtering is named for English mathematician Thomas Bayes, who developed a theory of 
probability inference. The main theorem of Bayesian Filtering says that the posterior density 
𝑝  𝑆𝑘   𝑍𝑘  ) can be computed recursively as follows: 
𝑝  𝑆𝑘   𝑍𝑘  ) ∝ 𝑝 (𝑍𝑘| 𝑆𝑘  ) ∫𝑝 𝑆𝐾−1 𝑍𝑘−1 𝑝( 𝑆𝐾 𝑆𝐾−1 𝑑𝑆𝐾−1,  
where 𝑝 (𝑍𝑘| 𝑆𝑘  ) is a measurement model given as a likelihood function and  𝑝(𝑆𝐾 𝑆𝐾−1  is a 
dynamic model. Figure 11 illustrates the finding of posterior distribution 𝑝  𝑆0 ∶ 𝑛   𝑍0 ∶ 𝑛  ), where 
𝑆0 ∶ 𝑛   are the states that can‘t be obersed and have to be estimated, and 𝑍0 ∶ 𝑛  are the nosiy 
obervations. Nonparametric methods based on the Monte-Carlo sampling have been successfully 
used to solve the above Bayesian filtering equation in many different applications [62, 63]. It is 
relatively straightforward to apply the aforementioned Bayesian filtering framework to the 
single-object tracking problem and, as a result, it is considered more or less a solved problem in 
the tracking community. The multi-object tracking problem, however, is not a simple extension 
of the single-object tracking problem due to the data association problem - which measurements 
are associated with which states in the multi-object setting? Figure 12 illustrates the main 
challenge of the data association problem for a simple case of two objects. Given 𝑁 states Sk  and 
𝑁 measurements 𝑍𝑘  , there are 𝑁! ways to associate the measurements with the states. One can 
see that, in the worst case, there are exponentially many ways to associating measurements to 
states. 
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Figure 11. Posterior distribution calculation 
 
 
Figure 12. A problem of states and measurements association 
There is no any computationally efficient algorithm for this problem. This problem is 
known to be NP-hard, since one can formulate the data association problem as the multi-
dimensional assignment (MDA) problem [64, 65]. 
As a result of the NP-hardness, all the existing data association algorithms are heuristics. 
In other words, there always exists a finite probability of the tracking system being confused 
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about the identities of objects after a data association algorithm is applied, which we call identity 
swapping. Figure 13 illustrates the identity swapping. In the figure, two objects moving along 
curly lines. A sub-optimal data association algorithm, however, could make a wrong association 
and concludes that the lower object is the object 1 and the upper object is the object 2. When 
there are many objects, these could lead to many instances of identity swapping and it is not 
possible to design reliable high-level applications based on the outputs of the tracking systems. 
 
Figure 13. Entity swapping example 
Given the nature of the data association problem, it seems that we cannot avoid the 
identity swapping problem. In a WSN, however, it is likely that some sensors are very close to 
moving objects and thus able to sense attributes of objects that can be used to fix the identity 
swapping problem. For example, suppose a sensor near the bottom object in Figure 13 reports 
the nearby object is actually the object 2. In this simple case, this local evidence implies that the 
upper object is the object 1and we can effectively fix the identity swapping problem using only 
 61 
 
local evidence on object identity. We use the exclusion among the two identities to update both 
of the identities - global information - using only local evidence. 
5.5.  Multi-target Tracking in WSNs 
Multiple-target tracking is a representative real-time application of sensor networks as it 
exhibits different aspects of sensor networks such as event detection, sensor information fusion, 
multi-hop communication, sensor management and real-time decision making. The task of 
tracking multiple objects in a sensor network is challenging due to constraints on a sensor node 
such as short communication and sensing ranges, a limited amount of memory and limited 
computational power. In addition, since a sensor network surveillance system needs to operate 
autonomously without human operators, it requires an autonomous real-time tracking algorithm 
which can track an unknown number of targets. In this work, we develop a scalable real-time 
multiple-target tracking algorithm that is autonomous and robust against transmission failures, 
communication delays and sensor localization error. In particular, there is no performance loss 
up to the average localization error of .7 times the separation between sensors and the algorithm 
tolerates up to 50% lost-to-total packet ratio and 90% delayed-to-total packet ratio. 
In wireless ad-hoc sensor networks, many inexpensive and small sensor-rich devices are 
deployed to monitor and control our environment [81]. Each device, called a sensor node, is 
capable of sensing, computation and communication. Sensor nodes form a wireless ad hoc 
network for communication. The limited supply of power and other constraints, such as 
manufacturing costs and limited package sizes, limit the capabilities of each sensor node. For 
example, a typical sensor node has short communication and sensing ranges, a limited amount of 
memory and limited computational power. However, the abundant number of spatially spread 
sensors will enable us to monitor changes in our environment accurately despite the inaccuracy 
 62 
 
of each sensor node. Multiple-target tracking is a representative real-time application of sensor 
networks as it exhibits different aspects of sensor networks such as event detection, sensor 
information fusion, communication, sensor management, and real-time decision making. The 
applications of tracking using sensor networks include surveillance, search and rescue, disaster 
response system, pursuit evasion games [83], distributed control [84], spatial-temporal data 
collection, and other location based services [82]. However, the task of tracking multiple objects 
in a sensor network is challenging due to the following issues. Each sensor node has a limited 
supply of power, leading to low detection probability and high false alarm rate. The presence of 
false alarms and missing observations complicate the problems of track initiation and 
termination. These important issues are ignored by many tracking algorithm designed for sensor 
networks. For example, when the false alarm rate is high, a naive track initiation algorithm will 
overflow the network with spurious tracks. Hence, an algorithm for sensor networks must be 
robust against the low detection probability and high false alarm rate. To conserve power and 
reduce interference, multi-hop routing is used in sensor networks. In many cases, the 
communication links are not reliable, causing transmission failures. In addition, due to the low 
communication bandwidth and a limited amount of memory, communication delays can occur 
frequently. Moreover, the localization of sensor nodes in an ad-hoc wireless sensor network 
without expensive hardware such as the global positioning system (GPS) is a challenging 
problem [85]. Since the position of a target is reported with respect to the location of the 
reporting sensor, the algorithm must be robust against the sensor localization error. It is well 
known that communication is costlier than computation in sensor networks in terms of power 
usage [86]. Hence, it is essential to fuse local observations before the transmission. However, 
since the data association problem of multiple-target tracking is NP-hard [87], we cannot expect 
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to solve it with only local information. But at the same time we cannot afford to have a 
centralized algorithm since such a solution is not scalable. Lastly, in sensor networks, we seek 
for an autonomous tracking algorithm which does not require a continuous monitoring by a 
human operator.  In summary, we need a real-time tracking algorithm that is robust against the 
low detection probability and high false alarm rates; capable of initiating and terminating tracks; 
uses less memory; combines local information to reduce the communication load; and is 
scalable. Also it must be robust against transmission failures, communication delays and sensor 
localization error. But at the same time we want an algorithm that provides a good solution 
which approaches the optimum given enough computation time. 
In [8], Markov chain Monte Carlo data association (MCMCDA) is presented. MCMCDA 
can track an unknown number of targets in real-time and is an approximation to the optimal 
Bayesian filter. It has been shown that MCMCDA is computationally efficient compared to the 
multiple hypothesis tracker (MHT) [75] and outperforms MHT under extreme conditions, such 
as a large number of targets in a dense environment, low detection probabilities, and high false 
alarm rates [8]. MCMCDA is suitable for sensor networks since it can autonomously initiate and 
terminate tracks. Since transmission failure is another form of a missing observation, MCMCDA 
is robust against transmission failures. MCMCDA performs data association based on both 
current and past observations, so delayed observations, i.e., out-of-sequence measurements, can 
be easily combined with previously received observations to improve the accuracy of estimates. 
Furthermore, MCMCDA requires less memory as it maintains only the current hypothesis and 
the hypothesis with the highest posterior. It does not require the enumeration of all or some of 
hypotheses as in [75]. 
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MCMCDA uses MCMC sampling instead of summary over all possible associations like 
in MHT. This sampling method outperforms MHT on running time and memory requirement, 
especially under dense environment. However, MCMCDA still has a high rejection rate during 
sampling process. How to decrease the rejection rate, thereby further accelerate the tracing 
speed, is the main solving problem of our tracking algorithm. 
In this work, we extend the MCMCDA algorithm to sensor networks in a hierarchical 
manner so that the algorithm becomes scalable, and is able to systematically track an unknown 
number of targets in the presence of false alarms and missing observations and is robust against 
transmission failures, communication delays and sensor localization error. We consider a simple 
shortest-path routing scheme on a sensor network. The transmission failures and communication 
delays of the network are characterized probabilistically. We assume the availability of a small 
number of special nodes, super-nodes that are more capable than regular nodes in terms of 
computational power and communication range. Each node is assigned to its nearest super-node 
and nodes are grouped by super-nodes. We call the group of sensor nodes formed around a 
super-node as a ―tracking group‖. When a node detects a possible target, it communicates with 
its neighbors and observations from the neighboring sensors are fused and sent to its super-node. 
Each super-node receives the fused observations from its tracking group and executes the 
tracking algorithm. Each super-node communicates with neighboring super-nodes when a target 
moves away from its range. Lastly, the tracks estimated by super-nodes are combined 
hierarchically. Although a specific sensor network model is used for the performance evaluation, 
the algorithm is applicable for different routing algorithms and sensor models, e.g., distributed 
air traffic control [88]. 
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5.6.  Multi-Target Tracking Algorithm 
5.6.1. Problem Formulation 
In [8], the authors designed the MCMC data association (MCMCDA) algorithm for 
tracking an unknown number of targets that appear and disappear in the surveillance region 
during a surveillance period of time.  The Markov chain Monte Carlo data association algorithm 
can initiate and terminate tracks autonomously and is robust to a high level of false alarms and 
missing measurements, a common problem in sensor networks [89]. During a surveillance 
period 𝑇, 𝐾 targets appear in the surveillance region ℛ for some duration [𝑡𝑎
𝑘 , 𝑡𝑏
𝑘]∈[1, 𝑇]. Each 
target moves in ℛ at a random position at 𝑡𝑎
𝑘 , and moves out of ℛ  at 𝑡𝑏
𝑘 . At each time, a target 
disappears with probability 𝑝𝑧 . The number of targets arriving at each time over ℛ has a Poisson 
distribution with a parameter 𝜆𝑏𝑉, where 𝜆𝑏  is the birth rate of new targets per unit time, per unit 
volume of 𝑉. Similarly, the number of false alarms has a Poisson distribution with a parameter 
𝜆𝑓𝑉  where 𝜆𝑓  is the false alarm rate per unit time, per unit volume of  𝑉 . The detecting 
probability of a noisy observation is  𝑝𝑑 . The number of observations at time 𝑡  is  𝑛(𝑡). The 
purpose of MCMCDA is to find the values 𝐾 and [𝑡𝑎
𝑘 , 𝑡𝑏
𝑘] (𝑘 = 1, 2, …, 𝐾). 
5.6.2. MCMC Based Algorithm 
MCMCDA adopts the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to generate samples from a 
distribution  𝜋  on a solution space 𝛺  by constructing a Markov chain with state ω ∈ 𝛺  and 
stationary distribution 𝜋(𝜔). The acceptance probability of a proposed state 𝜔′  is defined as: 
𝐴 𝜔, 𝜔′ = 𝑚𝑖𝑛{1,
𝜋 𝜔 ′  𝑞(𝜔 ′𝜔 ),
𝜋 𝜔 𝑞(𝜔 ,𝜔 ′ )
}, 
where parameter 𝜔 is the current state and 𝑞 is the proposal distribution. 
 66 
 
Let 𝑦 𝑡  = {𝑦𝑖 𝑡 : 𝑖 = 1, 2,… ,𝑛(𝑡)} be all observations at time 𝑡 and 𝑌 = { 𝑦 𝑡 :  1≤ 𝑡 
≤ 𝛵 } be all observations during the surveillance of 𝛵. The solution space 𝛺 is defined to be a 
collection of partitions of observations 𝑌, for ω∈ 𝛺: 
(1) ω = {𝜏0, 𝜏1, …, 𝜏𝛫  }; 
(2) 𝑌 = ∪𝑘=0 
𝐾 𝜏𝑘  and 𝜏𝑖 ∩ 𝜏𝑗 =  𝜙 for 𝑖≠ 𝑗; 
(3) 𝜏0 is a set of false alarms; 
(4) |𝜏𝑘  ∩ 𝑦 𝑡 | ≤ 1 for 𝑘 = 1, 2, …, 𝛫 and 𝑡 = 1, 2, …, 𝛵; and  
(5) |𝜏𝑘| ≥ 2 for 𝑘 = 1, 2, …, 𝛫. 
The MCMCDA defines the stationary distribution 𝜋 𝜔  as:      
𝑃(𝜔| 𝑌)  ∝ 𝑃(𝑌 𝜔 * 𝑃 𝜔 , 
where 
𝑃 𝜔 =  𝑝𝑧
𝑧 𝑡  1−𝑝𝑧 
𝑐 𝑡 𝑝𝑑
𝑑 𝑡  1 −  𝑝𝑑 
𝑔 𝑡 𝜆𝑏
𝑎 𝑡 𝜆𝑓
𝑓 𝑡  
𝑇
𝑡=1
 
𝑃(𝑌 𝜔 =   𝜏𝜖𝜔 ∖  𝜏0  𝒩 𝜏𝑖+1 
 𝜏 −1
𝑖=1 𝜇, 𝜎). 
In this framework, the tracking problem is to find a state 𝜔∗ with the maximum posterior among 
all of the checked states, i.e., 
𝜔∗ = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑃(𝜔|𝑌). 
The Kalman filter is used to estimate the expected value 𝜇 and covariance 𝜎. 𝑃(𝑌 𝜔  is 
the likelihood of observation;  𝑧 𝑡 : the number of targets terminated at time 𝑡; 𝑎(𝑡): the number 
of new targets at time 𝑡; 𝑑(𝑡): the number of actual targets detected at time 𝑡; 𝑒(𝑡 − 1): the 
number of targets from time 𝑡 − 1; 𝑐 𝑡 = 𝑒 𝑡 − 1 −  𝑧(𝑡): the number of targets from time 
 67 
 
𝑡 − 1  that have not been terminated at time 𝑡 ; 𝑔 𝑡 = 𝑐 𝑡 + 𝑎 𝑡 − 𝑑(𝑡) : the number of 
undetected targets; 𝑓 𝑡 = 𝑛 𝑡 −  𝑑 𝑡 : the number of false alarms. 
5.6.3. State Space Size Reduction 
In [3] the authors make assumptions that any target has a maximal directional speed   𝑣, 
and that the number of consecutive missing observations of any track is less than 𝑑 . In a sensor 
network, more powerful nodes (e.g., cluster heads) or the control center is the place to implement 
the tracking algorithm based on received observations from normal sensor nodes. Instead of only 
reporting a moving target‘s state, a sensor node could attach a little more information like the 
target‘s danger level in the reporting data. This attachment won‘t overload the network traffic but 
provide valuable clues on getting correct data associations. To further accelerate the convergence 
rate of the Markov Chain, we distinguish abnormal from normal observations and identify the 
moving scope of an intruder at each monitoring time. 
5.6.3.1. Distinguishing Normal and Abnormal Observations 
When a sensor node receives a modified or fake message from an intruder, it reports an 
abnormal observation to the cluster head. Otherwise it reports a normal observation. The state 
space is a collection of partitions of observations. Each partition has a number of tracks that 
consist of different observations. Each track can only include normal observation or abnormal 
observation, which reduces the size of the state space. Figure 14 shows an example of 
partitioning tracks with classified observations. Figure 14 (a) is an example of observation Y, in 
which dark circles represent abnormal observations, hollow circles represent normal 
observations, and the numbers represent observation times.  Figure 14 (b) represents an example 
of a partition ω of Y. 
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In this example, there are two observations in each of the five time steps. Without 
distinguishing the observations, there are thirty-two optional associations or tracks, assuming 
each track with five observations. However, there are only two associations with distinguished 
observation. It‘s obvious that distinguishing observations helps decrease searching correct 
associations scope. 
 
 
 
Figure 14. An example of track partition 
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5.6.3.2. Forecasting  Intruder Moving Direction 
We follow the method of [90], where it is assumed that a sensor node can sense an 
intruder approaching or moving away. We achieve this function by computing the energy level 
of signals, which requires small computational power [91].  
A sensor reports the movement trend of an intruder to the cluster head along with the 
normal or abnormal observation. The cluster predicts the movement of an intruder at a future 
time by collecting and analyzing received information from different sensors at a synchronized 
time and at the same position. Figure 15 illustrates three sensors. Two of them sense that an 
intruder is approaching them (+ symbol), and one senses that the intruder is moving away (- 
symbol). The triangle shows the intruder position. The prediction is that the future position of 
this intruder is in the shaded area. 
 
Figure 15. The future moving direction of an intruder within the shaded area 
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Traditionally, the joint particle filter is used for sampling on target tracking. However, 
this filter method suffers from exponential complexity in the number of tracked targets. As a 
result, we replace this traditional importance sampling step in the particle filter with an MCMC 
sampling step. This approach has the appealing property that the filter behaves as a set of 
individual particle filters when the targets are not interacting, but efficiently deals with 
complicated interactions when targets approach each other. The simulation results will show that 
the MCMC based tracking method is efficient on tracking multi-targets. 
Detailing observations like distinguishing normal observations from abnormal ones and 
sensing targets‘ moving direction is one approach we adopted to accelerate tracking speed. 
Another approach is to use Tabu Search technique to find an optimal data association among 
observations. Since the proposed Tabu Search method has a general function on searching for an 
optimal solution based on received data, we devote a separate chapter to introduce it. 
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CHAPTER 6. TABU SEARCH 
Although the MCMCDA give good results, it has one major disadvantage in that it has a 
high rejection rate during the sampling process. Motivated by this, we decide to adopt Tabu 
search (TS) technique to mitigate the high rejection rate. First, some basic concepts of Tabu 
search are introduced, and then is our designed Tabu search algorithm.  
6.1.  Basic Concepts 
6.1.1. Historical Background 
Before introducing the basic concepts of Tabu search, we believe it is useful to go back in 
time to try to better understand the genesis of the method and how it relates to previous work. 
Heuristics, i.e., approximate solution techniques, have been used since the beginnings of 
operations research to tackle difficult combinatorial problems. With the development of 
complexity theory in the early 1970s, it became clear that, since most of these problems were 
indeed NP-hard, there was hope of ever finding efficient exact solution procedures for them. This 
realization emphasized the role of heuristics for solving the combinatorial problems that were 
encountered in real-life applications and that needed to be tackled, whether or not they were NP-
hard. While many different approaches were proposed and experimented with, the most popular 
ones were based on hill climbing. The latter can roughly be summarized as an iterative search 
procedure that, starting from an initial feasible solution, progressively improves it by applying a 
series of local modifications or moves (for this reason, hill climbing is in the family of local 
search methods). At each iteration, the search moves to an improving feasible solution that 
differs only slightly from the current one. In fact, the difference between the previous and the 
new solution amounts to one of the local modifications mentioned above. The search terminates 
when no more improvement is possible. At this point, we have a local optimum with regard to 
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the local modifications considered by the hill climbing method. Clearly, this is an important 
limitation of the method: unless one is extremely lucky, this local optimum will often be a fairly 
mediocre solution. The quality of the solution obtained and computing times are usually highly 
dependent upon the ''richness" of the set of transformations (moves) at each iteration. In 1983, a 
new heuristic approach called simulated annealing [95] was shown to converge to an optimal 
solution of a combinatorial problem, albeit in infinite computing time. Based on analogy with 
statistical mechanics, simulated annealing could be interpreted as a form of controlled random 
walk in the space of feasible solutions. The emergence of simulated annealing indicated that one 
could look for other ways to tackle combinatorial optimization problems and spurred the interest 
of the research community. In the following years, many other new approaches, mostly based on 
analogies with natural phenomena, were proposed such as Tabu search, ant systems and 
threshold methods. Together with some older ones, in particular genetic algorithms, they gained 
an increasing popularity. Now collectively known under the name of meta-heuristics, a term 
originally coined by [93], these methods have become, over the last 15 years, the leading edge of 
heuristic approaches for solving combinatorial optimization problems. 
6.1.2. Tabu Search 
Fred Glover proposed in 1986 a new approach, which he called Tabu search, to allow hill 
climbing to overcome local optima. In fact, many elements of this first Tabu search proposal, and 
some elements of later elaborations, had already been introduced in [96] including short-term 
memory to prevent the reversal of recent moves, and longer-term frequency memory to reinforce 
attractive components. The basic principle of Tabu search is to pursue the search whenever a 
local optimum is encountered by allowing non-improving moves; cycling back to previously 
visited solutions is prevented by the use of memories (called tabu lists) that record the recent 
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history of the search. The key idea to exploit information to guide the search can be linked to the 
informed search methods proposed in the late 1970s in the field of artificial intelligence. It is also 
important to remark that Glover did not see Tabu search as a proper heuristic, but rather as a 
meta-heuristic, i.e., a general strategy for guiding and controlling "inner" heuristics specifically 
tailored to the problems at hand. 
6.1.3. Search Space and Neighborhood Structure 
As just mentioned, Tabu search extends hill climbing methods. In fact, the basic Tabu 
search can be seen as simply the combination of hill climbing with short-term memories. It 
follows that the two first basic elements of any Tabu search heuristic are the definition of its 
search space and its neighborhood structure. The search space is simply the space of all possible 
solutions that can be considered (visited) during the search. An attractive search space is the set 
of feasible vectors of location variables, i.e., feasible vectors in {0, 1}𝐽  (where |𝐽|  is the 
cardinality of set 𝐽), any solution in that space being "completed" to yield a feasible solution to 
the original problem by computing the associated optimal flow variables. It is important to note 
that it is not always a good idea to restrict the search space to feasible solutions. In many cases, 
allowing the search to move to infeasible solutions is desirable and sometimes necessary closely 
linked to the definition of the search space is that of the neighborhood structure. At each iteration 
of Tabu search, the local transformations that can be applied to the current solution, denoted 𝑆S, 
define a set of neighboring solutions in the search space, denoted 𝑁(𝑆) (the neighborhood of 𝑆). 
Formally, 𝑁(𝑆)  is a subset of the search space defined by:  
𝑁 𝑆 =  𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑏𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑜 𝑆. 
In general, for any specific problem at hand, there are many more possible (and even, 
attractive) neighborhood structures than search space definitions. This follows from the fact that 
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there may be several plausible neighborhood structures for a given definition of the search space. 
This is easily illustrated on our job shop scheduling problem. In order to simplify the discussion, 
we assume in the following that the search space is the feasible space. Simple neighborhood 
structures for the job shop scheduling problem are obtained by considering the sequence of jobs 
associated with a machine schedule, where the position of a job in the sequence corresponds to 
its processing order on the machine. For example, one can move a job at another position in the 
sequence or interchange the position of two jobs. While these neighborhood structures involve 
only one or two jobs, the neighborhoods they define contain all the feasible schedules that can be 
obtained from the current one either by moving any single job at any other position or by 
interchanging any two jobs. Examining these neighborhoods can thus be fairly demanding. In 
practice, it is often possible to reduce the computational burden, by identifying a restricted subset 
of moves that are feasible and can lead to improvements. When different definitions of the search 
space are considered for a given problem, neighborhood structures will inevitably differ to a 
considerable degree. This can be illustrated on our capacitated plant location problem. If the 
search space is defined with respect to the location variables, neighborhood structures will 
usually involve the so-called "Add/Drop" and "Swap" moves that respectively change the status 
of one site (i.e., either opening a closed facility or closing an open one) and move an open 
facility from one site to another (this move amounts to performing simultaneously an Add move 
and a Drop move). If, however, the search space is the set of extreme points associated with 
feasible flow vectors, these moves become meaningless. One should instead consider moves 
defined by the application of pivots to the linear programming formulation of the transportation 
problem, where each pivot operation modifies the flow structure to move the current solution to 
an adjacent extreme point. The preceding discussion should have clarified a major point: 
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choosing a search space and a neighborhood structure is by far the most critical step in the design 
of any Tabu search heuristic. It is at this step that one must make the best use of the 
understanding and knowledge one has of the problem at hand. 
6.1.4. Tabus 
Tabus are one of the distinctive elements of Tabu search when compared to hill climbing. 
As we already mentioned, tabus are used to prevent cycling when moving away from local 
optima through non-improving moves. The key realization here is that when this situation 
occurs, something needs to be done to prevent the search from tracing back its steps to where it 
came from. This is achieved by making certain actions Tabu. This might mean not allowing the 
search to return to a recently visited point in the search space or not allowing a recent move to be 
reversed. For example, in the job shop scheduling problem, if a job 𝑗 has been moved to a new 
position in a machine schedule, one could declare tabu moving that job back to its previous 
position for some number of iterations (this number is called the tabu tenure of the move). Tabus 
are stored in a short-term memory of the search (the tabu list) and usually only a fixed and fairly 
limited quantity of information is recorded. In any given context, there are several possibilities 
regarding the recorded information. One could record complete solutions, but this requires a lot 
of storage and makes it expensive to check whether a potential move is tabu or not; it is therefore 
seldom used. The most commonly used tabus involve recording the last few transformations 
performed on the current solution and prohibiting reverse transformations (as in the example 
above); others are based on key characteristics of the solutions themselves or of the moves. To 
better understand how tabus work, let us go back to our reference problems. In the job shop 
scheduling problem, one could define tabus in several ways. To continue our example where a 
job 𝑗  has just been moved from position 𝑝1 to position 𝑝2 , one could declare tabu specifically 
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moving back 𝑗  to position 𝑝1 from position 𝑝2 , and record this in the short-term memory as the 
triplet (𝑗, 𝑝2, 𝑝1 ). Note that this type of tabu will not constrain the search much, but that cycling 
may occur if 𝑗 is then moved to another position 𝑝3, and then from 𝑝3, to 𝑝1. A stronger tabu 
would involve prohibiting moving back 𝑗  to 𝑝1 (without consideration for its current position) 
and be recorded as (𝑗, 𝑝1). An even stronger tabu would be to disallow moving 𝑗 at all, and would 
simply be noted as 𝑗.  
In the capacitated plant location problem, tabus on Add/Drop moves should prohibit 
changing the status of the affected location variable and can be recorded by noting its index. 
Tabus for Swap moves are more complex. They could be declared with respect to the site where 
the facility was closed, to the   site where the facility was opened, to both locations (i.e., 
changing the status of both location variables is tabu), or to the specific swapping operation. 
Multiple tabu lists can be used simultaneously and are sometimes advisable. For example, in the 
capacitated plant location problem, if one uses a neighborhood structure that contains both 
Add/Drop and Swap moves, it might be a good idea to keep a separate tabu list for each type of 
move. Standard tabu lists are usually implemented as circular lists of fixed length. It has been 
shown, however, that fixed-length tabus cannot always prevent cycling, and some authors have 
proposed varying the tabu list length during the search [97]. Another solution is to randomly 
generate the tabu tenure of each move within some specified interval. Using this approach 
requires a somewhat different scheme for recording tabus, which are usually stored as tags in an 
array. The entries in this array typically record the iteration number until which a move is tabu. 
6.1.5. Termination Criteria 
 In theory, the search could go on forever, unless the optimal value of the problem at hand 
is known beforehand. In practice, obviously, the search has to be stopped at some point. The 
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most commonly used stopping criteria in Tabu search are:  after a fixed number of iterations (or 
a fixed amount of CPU time); after some number of consecutive iterations without an 
improvement in the objective function value (the criterion used in most implementations); or 
when the objective function reaches a pre-specified threshold value. 
6.1.6. Probabilistic Tabu Search and Candidate Lists 
Normally, one must evaluate the objective function for every element of the 
neighborhood 𝑁 𝑆  of the current solution. This can be extremely expensive from a 
computational standpoint. In probabilistic Tabu search, only a random sample 𝑁 ′ 𝑆  of 𝑁(𝑆) is 
considered, thus significantly reducing the computational overhead. Another attractive feature is 
that the added randomness can act as an anti-cycling mechanism. This allows one to use shorter 
tabu fists than would be necessary if a full exploration of the neighborhood was performed. One 
the negative side, it is possible to miss excellent solutions. It is also possible to probabilistically 
select when to apply tabu criteria. Another way to control the number of moves examined is by 
means of candidate list strategies, which provide more strategic ways of generating a useful 
subset 𝑁 ′ 𝑆  of 𝑁 𝑆 . In fact, the probabilistic approach can be considered to be one instance of 
a candidate list strategy, and may also be used to modify such a strategy. Failure to adequately 
address the issues involved in creating effective candidate lists is one of the more conspicuous 
shortcomings that differentiate a naive Tabu search implementation from one that is more solidly 
grounded. 
6.2.  The Proposed Tabu Search Method 
Over the last ten years, many researchers committed to the research of Tabu search, and 
published hundreds of paper presenting application of Tabu search, a heuristic method originally 
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proposed in [93]. In several cases, the methods described provide solutions very close to 
optimality and are among the most effective, if not the best, to track the difficult problems at 
hand. These successes have made Tabu search extremely popular among those interested in 
finding good solutions to the large combinatorial problems encountered in many practical 
settings. In this work, we apply Tabu search to a new setting – optimizing sampling rate. 
We utilize a local search technique to sample from the obtained observations. The 
sampling process is divided into two steps. First, an initial feasible set of tracks is constructed. 
Second, an improved new neighboring set of tracks is found.  We define a cost function for each 
track as below: 
𝑓 𝜏𝑘 =   𝜆𝑑𝑖,𝑖+1 +  𝜆
2𝑝𝑖 ,𝑖+1 + 𝜆
3𝑡𝑖 ,𝑖+1 
𝑛−1
𝑖=1 (𝑘 = 1 …𝐾). 
We use 𝜏𝑘  for the 𝑘𝑡𝑕 track; 𝑛 is the number of observations in track 𝜏𝑘 ; 𝑑𝑖 ,𝑖+1, 𝑡𝑖 ,𝑖+1 and 
𝑝𝑖 ,𝑖+1 are Boolean values representing if the distance of two sequential observations exceeds a 
threshold value; if the types of two sequential observations are identical; and if the relative 
position of two sequential observations is in the forecasted area (the shaded area in Figure 15). 
An improved track must have cost that is no larger than the cost of the old track. The new 
neighboring set of tracks can include one or more than one improved tracks according to actual 
requirements. This new neighboring solution is used as a proposed state to calculate the 
acceptance probability in the MCMC algorithm. 
A neighborhood structure for defining moves, based on ejection chains, was introduced in 
the context of the traveling salesman problem [92]. The neighborhoods defined by ejection 
chains provide the foundation for the more advanced levels of the solution method. Such 
neighborhoods are designed to produce moves of greater power with an efficient investment of 
computer effort. This method is a local search optimization technique which tries to minimize a 
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cost function 𝐹(𝑥), where 𝑥 represents a parameter vector, by iteratively moving from a solution 
𝑥 to a solution 𝑥0 in the neighborhood of 𝑥 (according to a neighborhood function 𝐻(𝑥)) until a 
stopping criterion is satisfied or a predetermined number 𝑁 of iterations is reached. 
We developed an ejection chain algorithm (algorithm 3) for use it in the Tabu search 
framework to determine if a trial set of tracks from received observations during a surveillance 
period. We group the observations by time period, and then identify trial solutions in each group 
of observations using a proposed ejection chain algorithm. A trial solution is a connection among 
observations in a group. Ultimately, we combine all these group trial solutions to get a final trial 
set of tracks. Figures 16 and 17 illustrate the method. Figure 16 is a set of observations 
𝑌 between time 𝑡1 and 𝑡3. Figure 17 illustrates the process of searching for a trial set of tracks 
from the observations. The observations are divided into two groups. Figure 17(a) is a trial 
solution on the first group observations, Figure 17(b) is another trial solution on the second 
group observations, and Figure 17(c) is the final combined trial solution. This Divide-and-
Conquer approach partitions an optimization problem into relatively independent sub-
optimization problems, and accelerates the optimization process. 
 
Figure 16. An example of a set of observations Y  
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Figure 17. Illustration of searching for  an optimal trial set of tracks  
Combing MCMC with Tabu search on multi-target tracking is a significant feature on our 
work, and the simulation results will show that Tabu search is useful on keeping a low rejection 
rate. 
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Algorithm 3:  Ejection chain algorithm (ECA) 
𝒏𝟏 ∶ number of observation in the first column 
𝒏𝟐 ∶ number of observation in the second column 
𝑳 ∶    current Ejection level 
𝑳∗ ∶  the current best ejection level 
1. Set 𝐿 = 1, 𝐿∗ = 𝐿. 
2. Create the first level of the ejection chain 
a. Start from the node which has the largest track cost 
b. Try to generate a new trial solution with no larger cost 
c. if  no such trial solution, go to step 4 
d. Update current trial solution 
e. if  no ejection occurred, go to step 4 
f. Record the last ejection node 𝑒𝐿. 
3. Increase the chain to further levels 
a. Set 𝐿 = 𝐿 + 1; 
b. Start from 𝑒𝐿, determine a new element that doesn‘t increase the cost 
c. Update current trial solution and 𝑒𝐿; 
d. if 𝐿 < 𝑀𝑎𝑥_𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝐿 & 𝐿 < 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝑛1,𝑛2) go back to step 3, otherwise go to step 4 
4. Get a new trial solution 𝑆 ′; 
5. Exit 
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Algorithm 4:  Tabu search algorithm (TSA) 
      𝑻𝒆𝒎𝒑: flag 
      𝑻𝑴:       the maximum value of iteration 
1. Generate a starting solution in 𝑆 randomly, let 𝑆∗ = 𝑆;    
2. Call ECA (Algorithm 3) 
3. if  improving: set 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝 = 0, update the best solution with the new current solution 
𝑆∗ = 𝑆 ′; Otherwise 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝++; if   𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝 < 𝑇𝑀 return to step2, otherwise Exit 
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CHAPTER 7. SIMULATION RESULTS 
We performed experiments on Ns-2 (v2.33), a popular simulation tool, and the numerical 
computing environment MATLAB 7.0. The test area is a 750 by 750 square region, and a set of 
sensor nodes is randomly deployed in this area in each experiment. We conducted two groups of 
simulations to evaluate the efficiency of the proposed security scheme. The first group of 
simulations includes two experiments: one experiment to estimate the efficiency of the proposed 
immune-inspired algorithm on detecting malfunctioning nodes and another experiment to test the 
ability of defending Gray Hole attacks in a sensor network. The second group of simulations is 
conducted to assess the performance of the proposed multiple-target tracking algorithm on 
tracking intruders in a sensor network. 
7.1.  Misbehavior Detection Results 
7.1.1. Flooding Attack Detection Results 
7.1.1.1. The Network Lifetime Analysis 
First, we generate a small size network to show how malicious nodes affect normal 
nodes‘ energy consumption. This network has 19 normal nodes and one malicious node, which 
attacks the network by sending high frequency packets to its neighboring nodes. The initial 
energy of each node is 500 (Joules), and the simulation time is 500 (seconds). Table 2 shows the 
average energy consumption of one normal node with and without this malicious node. The data 
show that this malicious node conducting a flooding attack can rapidly deplete a normal node‘s 
battery life.  
Next, we generate a larger size network that has 50 nodes in the test area. When a sensor 
node runs out of battery life, normally or abnormally, it becomes a failed sensor node. We 
assume that a prescribed number of failed nodes will cause network failure and treat this as the 
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only factor affecting the network lifetime. We set the number of failed nodes that cause the 
network failure to 30 (60%). To estimate the efficiency of the DC-inspired algorithm, we sample 
the values of failed sensor nodes at different time slots, and compare the results with an 
experiment that simulates the proposed DCA and a parallel experiment in which no security 
mechanism is employed. We randomly deploy 5, 10 and 15 intruders in the test area and perform 
experiments on each case. 
Table 2.  Energy Consumption of a Normal Node 
Time (Second) 
Energy (Joules) 
Zero malicious node One malicious node 
2.556954 497.442198 497.435126 
50.016782 449.982866 412.499193 
100.059589 399.940107 286.113860 
150.009188 349.990460 151.504656 
200.040950 299.958698 1.010425 
250.002041 249.997607 0 
300.012181 199.987515 0 
350.024937 149.974711 0 
400.008223 99.991473 0 
450.000509 49.998771 0 
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Table 3 and Table 4 demonstrate the percent of failed nodes under different sampling 
times. Table 3 summarizes the results without security mechanism applied to the network and 
Table 4 shows the results when the network is equipped with the proposed DCA. It only needs 
about 80 seconds to make the percent of failed nodes reach 60% if the network has no security 
mechanism. But the percent of failed nodes only reaches about 36% when the sampling time is at 
300 seconds. The network lifetime is obviously improved by the proposed security algorithm. 
Figures 18, 19, and 20 visually show the comparative data under different number of intruders in 
the network.  
Table 3.  Percent of Failed Nodes (without Security) 
No. of Intruders 
Sampling Time (Sec.) 
20 40 60 80 100 120 
5 2 6 13 18 79 96 
10 1 27 40 62 89 97 
15 2 30 51 69 93 98 
 
Table 4.  Percent of Failed Nodes (with Security) 
No. of Intruders 
Sampling Time (Sec.) 
50 100 150 200 250 300 
5 3 8 17 22 27 28 
10 3 10 22 31 37 37 
15 2 12 25 34 42 43 
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Figure 18. Sampling time vs. failed rate with 5 intruders 
 
Figure 19. Sampling time vs. failed rate with 10 intruders 
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Figure 20. Sampling time vs. failed rate with 15 intruders 
7.1.1.2. Impact of Cache Size 
In the second group of experiments, we keep the same size of the test area and the 
network size as in the first group of experiments. Our aim is to measure the effect of the cache 
size on the detection rate of the DC-inspired algorithm. To detect a harmful intruder, a sensor 
node uses a cache to store the abnormal packets received from an intruder, and to monitor the 
intruder for a period of time to assess whether or not this is a harmful intruder. We set the cache 
size to 20, 40, 100, 200 and 300 units and perform experiments on each cache size. 
 Table 5 and Figure 21 show the experimental results. As expected, a larger size cache 
uniformly has a higher detection rate than a small cache. There is a flattening of the curves after 
a cache size of 150, indicating only marginal benefits of caches of size 200 or larger. When there 
are 5 intruders, the algorithm detects almost all of the harmful intruders with a cache size of 300.  
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Table 5.  Intruder Detection Rate (%) vs. Cache Size 
No. of Intruders 
Cache Size (unit) 
20 40 100 200 300 
5 30 60 73 88 90 
10 26 37 60 71 82 
15 20 33 51 63 72 
 
 
Figure 21. Cache size vs.  detection rate 
The above results also show that the procedure achieves a uniformly better detection rate 
for smaller numbers of intruders than for larger numbers, for any of the cache sizes. This is 
because the packets that a sensor node receives from harmful intruders are saved in the shared 
cache, and, when the cache is full, old packets will be removed from the cache, even though these 
packets may still be useful for detecting an intruder. Hence, the algorithm has a lower detection 
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rate when more intruders exist in the network. These experiment results indicate that cache size is 
an important factor for detecting harmful intruders. However, large cache sizes may be unrealistic 
in resource-limited low-end sensors. 
7.1.1.3. Malicious Nodes Detection Rate 
We randomly deploy 5, 10, and 15 intruders in the test area and perform experiments on 
each case. In each case, we take 10 samples. Table 6 and Figure 22 show the results for detecting 
malfunctioning sensor nodes.  
Table 6.  Intruder Detection Rate (%) vs. Sampling Time 
No. of Intruders 
Sampling Time (Sec.) 
30 90 150 210 270 300 
5 26 52 74 88 95 96 
10 19 38 62 72 82 85 
15 8 21 37 57 74 78 
 
 
Figure 22. Sampling time vs. attacked node detection rate  
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The above results show the DCA can detect more than 90% of the attacked sensor nodes 
when fewer than 10% of the intruders are harmful. The algorithm needs an initial period of time 
and a cache to monitor and identify a malfunctioning node. This explains why there is lower 
detecting rate at the beginning of the sampling times, and slightly decreased detecting rate when 
there are more harmful intruders. 
7.1.2. Packet Dropping Attack Detection Results 
After the malicious insiders that conduct packet dropping attack are detected using our 
proposed monitoring technique, we need to take further measures to maintain the normal 
operation of the network. We designed an improved packet routing method for preventing the 
packet dropping attack. In this section, we‘ll evaluate the performance of this method. The 
performance metrics include:  
(1) Packet Delivery Ratio - the ratio representing the number of delivered data packet to 
the destination. This illustrates the level of delivered data to the destination. The greater value of 
packet delivery ratio means the better performance of the protocol. Its calculation equation is: 
𝑃𝐷𝑅 =  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑑  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡  
(2) End-to-End Delay - the average time taken by a data packet to arrive in the 
destination. It also includes the delay caused by route discovery process and the queue in data 
packet transmission. Only the data packets that successfully are delivered to destinations are 
counted. Its calculation equation is: 
𝐸𝐸𝐷 =  (𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑣� 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 – 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒)  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠  
To investigate the effects of gray holes we simulated the wireless sensor network 
scenarios with and without gray hole nodes present in the network. The routing protocol we use 
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in the simulation is Dynamic Source Routing (DSR). We call our improved routing method as 
Optimal DSR (Op-DSR). To test the protocol DSR, we used two simulations. In the first 
scenario, we did not use any gray hole nodes and in the second scenario we added a gray hole 
node to the simulation. We then compared the results of the simulations. 
We used UDP protocol in both simulations and attached CBR (Constant Bit Rate) 
application that generates constant packets through the UDP connection. CBR packet size is 
chosen to be 512 bytes, and data rate is set to 1 MB. Duration of the scenarios is 20 seconds and 
the CBR connections started at time equals to 1.0 seconds and continued until the end of the 
simulation. We manually defined appropriate positions of the nodes to show the data flow and 
also introduce a movement only to Node 1 to show the changes of the data flow in the network. 
A gray hole node is included in the network for the second simulation. 
We used 20 nodes in the test networks and UDP connections are established between 
even and odd numbered nodes.  In this setup the even numbered nodes are the sending nodes and 
odd numbered nodes are the receiving nodes. Each connection is represented by  ri→j  (𝑖  the 
sending node, 𝑗 the receiving node). For example, r0→1  represents that Node 0 is transmitting to 
Node 1. Node 18 and Node 19 are used as gray holes during the simulations as needed. Thus, we 
could count the sent and received packets between any two nodes. We could also count the 
number of packets dropped at each node including the gray hole nodes.  In all the 20 scenarios 
we tested, the same nodes are acting as a source and sending to the same destination but in each 
scenario, every single node is placed at different coordinates and exhibits different movements. 
Node positions and movements are randomly generated. For each scenario, nodes move from a 
random starting point to a random destination with a speed that is randomly chosen. Total 
simulation time is set to 500 seconds and the CBR connections started at the first second of the 
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scenario and lasts for 450 seconds. We allowed 50 seconds for the buffers to be emptied after the 
transmission ends. In our scenarios CBR parameters are set to have the packet sizes of 512 bytes, 
and data rates of 10 KB/second. 
For each scenario we performed two simulations. In the first one every node is working 
in cooperation with each other to keep the network in communication. The packet loss in an ad-
hoc network without any malicious nodes is presented in Table 7. In the second, we introduced 
one malicious node that carries out the gray hole attack in the network. In this case Node 18 
acted as a gray hole and Node 19 was silent. We measured the number of packets sent by the 
source node and received by the destination node. We also tried to evaluate how many packets 
that could not reach the destination node are absorbed in the gray hole. These data are also 
shown in Table 8. 
Table 7.   Average Packet Loss Percentage without Gray Holes (Using DSR) 
Path Packet sent Packet received % of packets lost 
𝑟0→1 974.2 931.7 4.3 
𝑟2→3 1012.07 983.2 3.2 
𝑟4→5 1020.67 976.21 4.3 
𝑟6→7 1007.2 956.2 5.0 
𝑟8→9 987.4 955.1 3.2 
𝑟10→11  995.3 968.24 2.7 
𝑟12→13  1029.7 982.8 4.6 
𝑟14→15  1009.78 984.3 2.6 
𝑟16→17  988.2 956.8 3.1 
Total 9024.5 8695.0 3.6 
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We can see from Table 7 that DSR network has 3.6% packet loss without gray holes 
exist. But the percentage increases to 98.6%, shown in Table 8, when one gray hole exists in a 
network with 20 sensor nodes. Table 9 shows the results of packet loss when we use proposed 
routing method instead of the DSR protocol the average packet loss is 7.3%. Though it is still 
higher than 3.6%, it is much better than 98.6%. 
Table 8.  Average Packet Loss Percentage with Gray Holes (Using DSR) 
path Packet sent 
Packet 
received 
Packets 
dropped at 
gray hole 1 
Packets 
dropped at 
gray hole 2 
% of 
packets lost 
 
% of 
packets lost 
at the gray 
holes 
𝑟0→1 1097 6 246 253 99.5 45.5 
𝑟2→3 1110 49 294 578 95.6 78.6 
𝑟4→5 1072 2 693 80 99.8 72.1 
𝑟6→7 1111 1 311 42 99.9 31.8 
𝑟8→9 1089 2 421 502 99.8 84.8 
𝑟10→11  1130 6 460 519 99.4 86.6 
𝑟12→13  1128 52 302 672 95.6 86.3 
𝑟14→15  1113 18 158 578 98.2 66.1 
𝑟16→17  1112 2 414 337 99.8 67.5 
Total 9962 138 3299 3561 98.6 68.8 
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Table 9.  Average Packet Loss Percentage with Gray Holes  (Using Op-DSR) 
path Packet sent 
Packet 
received 
Packets 
dropped at 
gray hole 1 
Packets 
dropped at 
gray hole 2 
% of 
packets lost 
 
% of 
packets lost 
at the gray 
holes 
𝑟0→1 978 898 33 27 8.1 75 
𝑟2→3 1006 930 27 20 7.5 61.8 
𝑟4→5 1009 950 17 22 5.6 66.1 
𝑟6→7 1008 923 30 18 8.6 56.5 
𝑟8→9 1028 952 23 22 7.4 59.1 
𝑟10→11  993 927 33 12 6.7 68.1 
𝑟12→13  988 916 20 13 7.3 45.9 
𝑟14→15  986 908 22 25 7.9 60.1 
𝑟16→17  985 917 14 24 6.8 55.9 
Total 8981 8321 219 183 7.3 60.1 
 
Next, we‘ll analyze the performance of the Op-DSR on the packet delivery ratio and end-
to-end using DSR as the baseline. We did five groups of simulation in different sizes of network. 
Each network has 10% gray holes. The results are shown in Table 10 and Table 11. 
Table 10.  Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) 
No. of Nodes 10 20 30 40 50 
DSR 81.5 95.2 97.6 98.2 98.7 
Op-DSR 78.2 88.6 83.7 93.2 89.8 
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Table 11.  End-to-End Delay (Sec.)  
No. of Nodes 10 20 30 40 50 
DSR 3.3645 9.43356 2.64367 15.4327 5.37654 
Op-DSR 3.4471 8.76216 7.52374 9.64372 3.26583 
 
Table 10 shows the results of packet delivery ratio. The Op-DSR can maintain an 
acceptable packet delivery ratio. Table 11 shows the results of end-to-end delay. It also can 
maintain a similar level of EED as DSR does. 
7.2.  Misbehavior Monitoring Results 
To investigate the impact of Bayesian game theory based monitoring strategies on 
detecting malicious insiders. We simulate a network with the same size testing space and 50 
mobile nodes. The routing protocol we use is Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) and the routing 
cache is path cache with a primary and a secondary FIFO cache. The probing (querying) 
technique is implemented as a part of DSR. The simulation time is 100 seconds. The mobile 
nodes move within the network space with a maximum speed of 20.0 m/s. The pause time is 50 
seconds, which assures that the topology moderately changes. The communication patterns are 
10 constant bit rate (CBR) connections with a data rate of 4 packets per second. We randomly 
choose 0, 3, 6, 9, 12, and 15 malicious nodes in each of the simulations. 
The five metrics we choose for measuring the proposed monitoring strategies technique 
are: (1) malicious Node Detection Rate, the ratio of the number of detected malicious nodes and 
the total number of actual malicious nodes; (2) false Position Rate, the ratio of number of normal 
nodes mistakenly detected as malicious nodes and the total number of normal nodes; (3) packet 
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Delivery Rate, the ratio of total number of data packets received and the total number of data 
packets sent in application level; (4) network Overhead, the ratio of total number of routing 
related transmissions and the total number of packet transmissions. Each packet hop is counted 
as one transmission; and (5) extra Energy Consumption Rate, the ratio of the amount of energy 
used for probing other nodes and the amount of energy used for normal network communication. 
We study the proposed monitoring technique using the chosen metrics. The standard 
DSR (Standard_DSR) is used as baselines to compare with our proposed dynamic probe DSR 
(DSR_DProbe). We run the simulation three times and the averaged data are shown in the 
flowing tables and figures. Table 12 and Figure 23 show the detection rate. Table 13 and Figure 
24 show the false positive rate. Table 14 and Figure 25 show the packet delivery ratio. Table 15 
and Figure 26 show the percentage of network overhead. 
Table 12.  Detection Rate 
No. of Malicious Node (%) 0 0.06 0.12 0.18 0.24 0.30 
Detection Rate (%) 100 93 91 83 84 80 
 
Table 13.  False Positive Rate 
No. of Malicious Node (%) 0 0.06 0.12 0.18 0.24 0.30 
False Positive Rate (%) 2 7 7 6 8 7 
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Table 14.  Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) 
 
No. of Malicious Node (%) 
0 0.06 0.12 0.18 0.24 0.30 
DSR-DProbe 100 92 90 85 78 76 
Standard-DSR 100 82 83 72 68 60 
 
Table 15.  Network Overhead (%) 
 
No. of Malicious Node (%) 
0 0.06 0.12 0.18 0.24 0.30 
DSR-DProbe 17 16 15 20 24 26 
Standard-DSR 4 5 7 6 8 5 
 
 
Figure 23. Detection rate 
 98 
 
 
Figure 24. False positive rate 
 
Figure 25. Packet delivery rate (PDR) 
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Figure 26. Network overhead 
Table 12 shows the malicious node detection rate, which is averagely about 86 percent. 
Since malicious nodes don‘t drop packets with fixed frequency, it will have higher detection rate 
if the simulation time is longer. The false positive rate shown in Table 13 is less than 10 percent. 
It is mainly caused by the movement of nodes. Table 14 shows the packet delivery rate. Since 
malicious nodes are timely detected, our proposed method has better performance than the 
standard DSR. Table 15 shows the network overhead. The change speed of the network topology 
has obvious effect on the network overhead. When the network topology changes faster, more 
probe messages have to be sent out to identify dropped packets. 
The extra energy consumption is proportional to the number of probe packets, so we 
count how many probe packets are used for detecting malicious nodes to study this metric. In 
this simulation, we choose 9 malicious nodes in the network, and compare our dynamic probe 
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technique with the periodic probe technique in [27] on the extra energy consumption during the 
process of detection. The extra energy consumption results are shown in Table 16 and Figure 27.  
Table 16.  Extra Energy Consumption Rate 
 
Sampling Time (Sec.) 
0 20 40 60 80 100 
DSR-Probe 0 10 20 30 40 50 
DSR-DProbe 0 4 5 18 22 15 
 
 
Figure 27. Extra energy consumption rate 
The dynamic probe technique has similar detection rate with the probe technique in [27]. 
However, our method has obvious higher energy efficiency than the periodic probe technique. 
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Table XVIII shows that DSR-Prob method consumes 10% energy on the probing message, and 
our DSR-DProb method only consumes 4% energy at the sampling time 20sec. It‘s about 60% 
improvement on energy efficiency. And the average energy efficiency is about 65%. 
7.3.  Multi-target Tracking Results 
In this experiment, we utilize the similar simulation settings as in [8]. The surveillance 
area is a ℛ = [0, 100] × [0, 100] ∈ ℝ 2 rectangular region. The number of mobile targets K varies 
from 10 to 100. The other parameters are: 𝑇 = 50,  𝑝𝑑 = 0.85,  𝜆𝑓𝑉 = 1.0,  𝜆𝑏𝑉 = 1 ,  𝑝𝑧 =
 0.01, 𝑑 = 5, 𝑣 = 5 moving unit lengths per unit time. The state vector is𝑥 = [𝑥,𝑦, 𝑣𝑥 , 𝑣𝑦 ]
𝑇  , 
where  𝑥,𝑦  is a coordinate and (𝑣𝑥 , 𝑣𝑦 ) is a velocity vector. The Kalman filter is used to 
estimate the states of a target, and the models are: 
𝑥𝑡 = 𝐴𝑥𝑡−1 +  𝐵𝑤𝑘  
𝑦𝑡 = 𝐻𝑥𝑡 + 𝑣𝑡  
where 
𝐴 ∆ =  
1 0
0 1
∆ 0
0 ∆
0 0
0 0
1 0
0 1
   𝐵 ∆ =  
∆2 0
0 ∆2
∆ 0
0 ∆
   𝐻 ∆ =  
1 0
0 1
0 0
0 0
 
𝑇
 
𝑤𝑘   aand 𝑣𝑘 are white noises with Gaussian distributions 𝒩  0,𝜎𝑤
2  and 𝒩  0,𝜎𝑣
2  respectively, 
where 𝜎𝑤
2 = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔  100, 100  and 𝜎𝑣
2 = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔  20, 20 . To estimate the efficiency of finding the 
optimal solution among a state space, we specify value 0.9 as a threshold for 𝑃(𝜔| 𝑌). 
We adopt some algorithm-free metrics to evaluate the efficiency of the improved tracking 
algorithm. In real scenarios truths, or real targets‘ tracking, are not available. In this situation, the 
consistency of tracking results may be checked. Our work focuses on the other situation in which 
truths are available. 
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7.3.1. Trajectories Generation & Scenario Setup 
Figure 29-32 shows a scenario sample, in which 10 mobile targets appear during a period 
of supervision. The moving duration of each target under the surveillance period is shown in 
Table 17, and Figure 28 shows the number of appeared targets at each time step. The trajectories 
of these mobile targets functioning as available truths are shown in Figure 29. The received 
measurements or observations over the monitoring period are presented in Figure 30. Figure 31 
is a snapshot taken as tracking is performing, in which the solid lines represent obtained target 
tracking at the moment when the snapshot was taken, and the dotted lines represent received new 
measurements. The final tracking results are shown in Figure 32.   
Table 17.  Moving Duration of Each Target under a Surveillance Period [1, 50] 
 𝑇1 𝑇2 𝑇3 𝑇4 𝑇5 𝑇6 𝑇7 𝑇8 𝑇9 𝑇10 
Initial (𝑡𝑎 ) 15 16 2 6 2 14 7 12 21 8 
Terminal (𝑡𝑏 ) 45 50 36 41 36 50 50 50 50 37 
 
 
Figure 28. Appeared targets at each time step 
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Figure 29. Trajectories (K = 10) 
 
Figure 30. Cluttered measurements based on the trajectories 
 104 
 
 
Figure 31. A snapshot throughout the tracking 
 
Figure 32. The tracking results  
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    The accuracy of the proposed multi-target tracking algorithm can be visualized from 
the above four figures. Next, we‘ll use data to further demonstrate the efficiency of the proposed 
algorithm on running time. 
7.3.2. Evaluation metrics 
7.3.2.1. Running Time  
Computational cost is another important factor that should be taken in performance 
evaluation of tracking algorithms. Though MHT provides accurate and optimal results, it suffers 
from the huge computational cost. Therefore, for every tracking algorithm, the total time needed 
in order to run the tracker is represented as the total execution time. This metric may be really 
important in practice where trackers are supposed to be applied to the real time problems. 
The three lines in the Figure 33 represent CPU running time with the sample size as 
2000, 3500, and 5000 (10 targets, 50 observing time steps). The corresponding data are shown in 
Table 18. For each line, the running time changes with the number of appeared targets at 
different observing time steps. Figure 33 shows that the execution time of a tracking algorithm is 
proportional to the sample size (or number of samples). According to statistics, the larger the 
sample size is, the more chances the selected samples have to be like the average value. So it 
seems impossible to find an optimal solution using both smaller number of samples and shorter 
running time. However, we can indirectly solve this problem through improving the quality of 
the selected samples. In other words, we can try to select only those samples that are more likely 
representative of the population instead of random selection. We will show the effects of the 
mentioned sampling strategy on target tracking as below. 
 
 
 106 
 
Table 18.  Running Time (Sec.) with Different Sample Size 
 
Time Step 
Sample Size 
2000 3500 5000 
0 0 0 0 
5 0.0312 0.0312 0.0624 
10 0.0624 0.0781 0.1248 
15 0.1248 0.2028 0.2964 
20 0.156 0.2808 0.39 
25 0.1716 0.312 0.4524 
30 0.2184 0.3432 0.4992 
35 0.234 0.39 0.546 
40 0.234 0.3744 0.546 
45 0.2028 0.3588 0.4836 
50 0.2028 0.3276 0.4524 
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Figure 33. Time step vs. running time 
7.3.2.2. Sequence Tracking Detection Accuracy–Distance (STDA-D) 
We adopt the metric ―Sequence Tracking Detection Accuracy–Distance‖ (STDA-D) 
proposed in [98] to evaluate track accuracy. STDA-D is a spatio-temporal based measure 
penalizing fragmentation in the temporal and the spatial domains. To compute the STDA-D 
score, one needs to compute one-to-one match between the tracked targets and the ground truth 
targets. Given M matched tracks including tracked targets 𝜏𝑘(𝑖) and the corresponding ground 
truth tracks 𝐺𝑘(𝑖), 𝑘 =1, … , M, 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑇. The formula of STDA-D is 
𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐴 − 𝐷 =  
 (1 − 𝑑𝑡
′)𝑇𝑡=1
𝑁𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒 (𝐺𝑘 ∪ 𝜏𝑘  ≠ ∅)
𝑀
𝑘=1
 
𝑁𝐺 + 𝑁𝑇
2
    
where the denominator for each track 𝑁𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒  𝐺𝑘 ∪ 𝜏𝑘  ≠ ∅  indicates the number of frames in 
which either a ground truth or a tracked target (or both) is present. The numerator for each track 
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measures the spatial accuracy by computing the overlap of the matched tracking results over the 
ground truth targets in the sequence. The normalization factor is the average of number of 
tracked targets 𝑁𝑇 and the number of ground truth targets 𝑁𝐺 . STDA-D produces a real number 
value between 0 and 1 (worst and best possible performance respectively).  
The MCMCDA algorithm exhibits remarkable performance comparing to other 
association algorithms like MHT under extreme conditions, such as a large number of targets in a 
dense environment, low detection probabilities, and high false alarm rates [8]. In this experiment, 
instead of tracking 10 targets, we increase the number to 50. The number of frames or observing 
time steps is still 50. The data in Table 19 and the lines in Figure 34 show that the MCMCDA 
with new sampling strategies needs a smaller sample size to achieve the same STDA-D 
compared to the original MCMCDA. 
Table 19.  Sample Size vs. STDA-D 
 
Size of Sample ( 103) 
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 
I-MCMCDA 0.72 0.77 0.78 0.82 0.88 0.9 0.92 
MCMCDA 0.64 0.7 0.75 0.79 0.8 0.81 0.83 
MHT 0.18 0.2 0.22 0.3 0.39 0.41 0.42 
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Figure 34. Sample size  vs. STDA-D  
7.3.2.3. STDA-D vs. NUMBER OF Targets  
In this experiment, we vary the number of targets from 10 to 100. The other parameters 
are fixed: ℛ  = [0, 100] ×  [0, 100], 𝑇 = 50,  𝑝𝑑 =  0.85, 𝜆𝑓𝑉 =1.0,  𝜆𝑏𝑉 = 1 ,  𝑝𝑧 =  0.01 ,  𝑑 =
5, 𝑣 = 5 unit lengths per unit time. Since all targets are observed, the number of observations 
increases as the number of targets increases. The results for the three data association algorithms 
are the average values over 10 repeated runs and 10,000 samples are used. The average STDA-D 
for three different algorithms is shown in Table 20 and Figure 35. MHT indicates deteriorated 
performance with increasing number of targets due to pruning. However, MCMCDA and the 
improved version maintain good performance. 
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Table 20.  Number of Target vs. STDA-D 
 
Number of Targets 
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
I-MCMCDA .98 .96 .90 .83 .80 .74 .70 .64 .61 .58 
MCMCDA .97 .94 .87 .82 .79 .70 .68 .62 .58 .54 
MHT .90 .85 .56 .40 .26 .17 .15 .01 .08 .03 
 
 
Figure 35. Number of targets vs. STDA-D 
7.3.2.4. Running time vs. Number of Targets 
To demonstrate the efficiency of the proposed multi-target tracing algorithm on searching 
of optimal tracks, we conducted five groups of simulations with different numbers of targets. 
There were three experiments in each group, and three different multi-target tracking algorithms 
I-MCMCDA, MCMCDA, and MHT were separately implemented. Table 21 demonstrates the 
 111 
 
average running time of these algorithms. I-MCMCDA and MCMCDA have much better 
running speed than MHT. The average running time of MCMCDA and I-MCMCDA is similar 
because they run the same number of samples. In fact, I-MCMCDA needs less number of 
samples to find an optimal track than MCMCDA because we adopted the state space reduction 
mechanism and the Ejection Chain algorithm to accelerate the searching of optimal tracks. 
Figure 36 displays the expected results. 
Table 21.  Average Running Time (Sec.) 
 
Number of Targets 
10 20 30 40 50 
I-MCMCDA 35.88 67.021 102.23 266.45 502.47 
MCMCDA 35.01 60.132 138.02 240.345 550.33 
MHT 37.19 150.33 297.65 587.56 1243.32 
 
 
Figure 36. Average running time vs. number of targets 
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS 
Wireless Sensor Networks have been applied to many different application domains 
because of the attractive characteristics of sensors: small in size, easy deployment, and cheap on 
price. At the same time, these attractive characteristics also present challenges on designing 
convenient and effective security mechanisms that fit for wireless sensor networks. With a single 
security technique, it is hard to secure sensors from variety types of attacks. This dissertation 
explored some different techniques on preventing attacks in WSNs and combined them to design 
a two-phase security mechanism that is cable to provide higher level of security than any single 
one of the techniques. It is one of the distinguishing features of our work to integrate multiple 
techniques into one effective protection mechanism. This protection mechanism is for preventing 
attacks from insiders and outsiders, especially flooding and packet dropping attacks in WSNs. 
The used techniques include a danger theory inspired Dendritic Cell algorithm, a Bayesian game- 
based monitoring scheme, a Markov Chain Monte Carlo based targets tracking technique, and a 
Tabu search based sampling method.  
Each normal sensor node equipped with the DCA is responsible for detecting malicious 
sensor nodes and preventing their damage to a WSN by ceasing to respond to any requests from 
these nodes. Comparing with other immune-inspired intruder detection techniques, e.g., negative 
selection algorithm, the danger theory inspired Dendritic Cell algorithm has unique advantages. 
Since the DCA detects malicious nodes based on danger signals (divergent events) instead of 
only checking central database of blacklist, it is more capable of identifying new harmful 
intruders than negative selection algorithm. So DCA is more adaptable for sensing unpredictable 
environments. Also the DCA doesn‘t have complicated computation. It is a light resource 
consumption algorithm, which makes it possible to equip each sensor node with this algorithm. 
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Normally, a central control structure is difficult to apply to a wireless sensor network, especially 
a large one. Therefore, it is more applicable to run security algorithm on each sensor node itself. 
The designed DCA meets this requirement. 
To prevent general gray hole attack that randomly or strategically drop received packets, 
we first adopt Bayesian game theory based monitoring strategy to detect the attackers, and then 
we implement the proposed short-and-safe routing protocol to mitigate the packet dropping 
attack. The fundamental purpose of using this technique is to make sensor nodes productively 
use their energy while detecting malicious nodes.  The packet dropping attack is different from a 
flooding attack. Without a monitoring mechanism, the hidden attackers are difficult to detect. Of 
course, real-time monitoring is an ideal method. However, it is not practical to let energy-limited 
sensors do real-time monitoring.  Some works have been proposed to let sensors do periodic 
monitoring. But, what monitoring cycle should be chosen to achieve an optimal detection rate? It 
is not easy to answer this question. Instead of using periodic monitoring, we adopt a Bayesian 
game based monitoring method. This monitoring method makes a normal node able to 
dynamically adjust its monitoring strategies based on the attacker‘s danger level, which can be 
obtained from the designed DCA. This Bayesian game based monitoring method lets a normal 
node make an optimal monitoring strategy without knowing when the attacker drops packets. 
The obvious advantage of the dynamic monitoring method is the ability to reduce extra energy 
consumption, which is always a precious resource of sensor nodes, without losing detection rate. 
The above mentioned techniques all have strong adaptability because they can dynamically 
adjust their control parameters with a change of the external environment. This is an important 
criterion for designing a security algorithm. 
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Besides preventing malicious insiders, the proposed two-phase security mechanism is 
also used to prevent malicious outsiders, which are the true culprits of the damage to the WSNs 
security. The intruders may indirectly attack a WSN through compromised nodes. If they are not 
be tracked down, sometimes it is hard to maintain the security of a WSN. The intruders can 
compromise more normal nodes, and use the compromised nodes to attack the WSN. Therefore, 
it is necessary to design a multi-target tracking algorithm to improve the security of a WSN. 
Multi-target tracking deals with the state estimation of an unknown number of moving targets. 
The main difficulty comes from the assignment of a given measurement to a target model. The 
data association problem is to work out which measurements were generated by which targets. It 
is the key step to successfully track down the mobile targets. The multiple hypothesis tracker 
(MHT) algorithm, a popular multi-scan tracking algorithm, can lead to an NP-hard problem 
because the number of possible associations increases exponentially with time. So we adopt 
another data association algorithm, Markov Chain Monte Carlo Data Association (MMCDA), to 
do the multi-target tracking. MCMCDA is a true approximation scheme for the optimal Bayesian 
filter; i.e., when run with unlimited resources, it converges to the Bayesian solution. As the name 
suggests, MCMCDA uses Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling instead of summing 
over all possible associations. The purpose of the adopted target tracking technique is to track 
down harmful outsiders soon. So the convergence rate of MCMC sampling to reach an optimal 
solution is an important factor on evaluating the effectiveness of a multi-target tracking 
algorithm. 
To accelerate the convergence rate, we make some improvements. Firstly, we classify the 
measurements under the assumption that the measurements from harmful outsiders and normal 
outsiders can be distinguished. Secondly, we roughly predict a target‘s moving direction at some 
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time by analyzing the change of signal intensity, which information comes from different normal 
nodes. These two improvements decrease the search space; thereby speeding up the convergence 
rate. The last improvement is to design an ejection chain algorithm and employ a Tabu search 
technique to do the MCMC sampling. Instead of randomly taking samples from reported 
observations (measurements), which may lead to high rejection rate, Tabu search starts from an 
initial solution and evolves that single solution into a iteratively improved solution. Comparing 
to other local search techniques, Tabu search can prevent premature convergence to local optima. 
We group the observations, apply the Tabu search method in each group, and then combine the 
sub-solutions. This approach partitions an optimization problem into relatively independent sub-
optimization problems, and accelerates the optimization process. This is one of the contributions 
of our work. 
Each of the proposed security techniques in this dissertation has a certain ability on 
defending attacks in WSNs, and can be independently applied to different network security 
environments. It is another distinguishing feature of our work to adopt modular design concept 
on designing the security mechanism. 
The simulation results demonstrate that the proposed two-phase security mechanism can 
effectively improve the security of a WSN by promptly identifying internal and external trouble 
makers.  
We designed a DCA for detecting malicious insiders and anomaly events in WSNs. The 
efficiency of this algorithm mainly depends on the ability of identifying danger signals. How to 
precisely identify danger signals is a topic that needs to be further researched. How to find a 
heuristic solution faster on sampling is another future work to do. We consider designing an 
improved Ejection Chain Algorithm, which should have variable-exchange (i.e., n-opt) ability. 
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